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Unless otherwise indicated, these materials are full translations of articles appearing in People's Republic of China periodicals.

On Ch'ao Kai

by

Tu Hsün-ch'eng (杜恂诚)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

Ch'ao Kai was the leader of the Liangshan Mountain insurgent peasants. In "Water Margin," however, he was excluded from the 108 people.

Ch'ao Kai in fact contributed immensely to the Liangshan cause. As soon as he went to the mountain he corrected Wang Lun's closed-door line. In the first place Ch'ao Kai put forward a clearcut uprising program, that is, "Act in concert and assemble for the great cause of justice." "Assemble for the great cause of justice" was a call to the vast numbers of oppressed peasants to take the road of revolution and rebellion. Before seizing the birthday presents Ch'ao Kai and six others jointly took an oath declaring that "Liang Chung-shu did harm to the people in Peiching and took the money and things he swindled to Tungching to present them to Ts'ai the Royal Tutor as a birthday present. This is ill-gotten wealth." They termed the misdeeds of the feudal ruling class as "injustice" and identified their resistance as "assembly for justice." What a clearcut class stand they took! Therefore, the slogan "Act in concert and assemble for the great cause of justice" issued by Ch'ao Kai in a political sense provided the revolutionary peasants with a powerful appeal.

Ch'ao Kai advocated equality within the insurgent army, with each calling the other his brother. He distributed to all the birthday presents he grabbed and his own wealth and property as well. He also made proper arrangements for the old and young dependents of each family. He was therefore popular among the followers. Ch'ao Kai excelled in employing people and assigned them work in accordance with their respective abilities and qualifications. Whenever problems arose he would consult with everybody and this democratic practice prevailed. He also laid down strict discipline for the insurgent army. He spared the lives of captives, loved the common people, and prohibited killing rich merchants after their possessions were seized. The Liangshan insurgent army's strict organizational discipline endeared itself to the broad masses of the people. Militarily, Ch'ao Kai likewise introduced a number of positive measures such as making repairs to wooden fortifications, forging weapons, building water-borne troops and conducting daily drills in keeping ready at any time for battling against government troops.

"Once the clash started the new master took over, the gathering at Liangshan Mountain heralded a new cause." After Ch'ao Kai laid down a correct line for the peasant uprising, the Liangshan cause flourished. The insurgent army's successive victories over government troops boosted its prestige far and wide. Many heroes went up the mountain in succession,

assembling there for justice. By the time the peasant insurgent army attacked Tsengtou city a powerful backbone detachment had been formed. After Ch'ao Kai's death,Sung Chiang usurped Liangshan's leadership and organizationally pushed an altogether capitulationist line that was geared to the recruitment of renegades and defectors. Most of the nearly 20 leaders newly brought in by Sung Chiang were former army officers and big landlords like Lu Chün-i and Kuan Sheng, all of whom were seriously imbued with the idea of remaining loyal to the sovereign. As such they served as Sung Chiang's capable accomplices in pushing the capitulationist line.

Long before the assembly at Liangshan for justice took place, Ch'ao Kai had gained high prestige in the world of wandering stalwarts. Sung Chiang therefore always tried to please Ch'ao Kai and became the latter's "bosom" friend. Yet Ch'ao Kai made no mention of Sung Chiang when he agreed to accept the three Juan brothers recommended by Wu Yung as confederates in the plan to seize the birthday presents. Furthermore, Ch'ao Kai kept Sung Chiang totally in the dark about the attempted seizure of the birthday presents, indicating that he was exercising great caution in dealing with Sung Chiang. This is because Ch'ao Kai knew only too well that Sung Chiang was so influenced by the idea of remaining loyal to the monarch as the prime duty of an official that he could not possibly become one with the peasant insurgents. To tell him this would most likely cause trouble. This shows that Ch'ao Kai becoming Sung Chiang's "bosom" friend arose merely from a comradely bond which brought wandering adventurers together for the cause of justice, as diametrically opposed views were held by both. When later Sung Chiang learned of Ch'ao Kai's involvement in the seizure of the birthday presents he became so terrified that he thought Ch'ao Kai had committed a "towering crime." He meant that Ch'ao Kai had trespassed on the feudal rule, this being a "towering crime." This shows that Ch'ao Kai had the ability to know people and understand them.

Filled with a sense of duty toward the landlord class, Sung Chiang abandoned the Chingfengshan insurgent force that had turned to Liangshan and returned to his own farmstead to lead a peaceful life. His father told him that he had sent him an urgent message requesting his return for fear that he might be victimized by the brigands into joining their band and would thus become a disloyal and unfilial person. This paternal admonition so impressed Sung Chiang that he gave up the idea of going to Liangshan. When he was arrested for having killed Mrs. Yen, he told his father: "It is indeed fortunate for me to be sent to the yamen for should I be seized in the company of a band of roving adventurers like killers and arsonists tomorrow how could I face you?" What a loyal and filial son he was! Therefore, when he was on his way to banishment to Chiangchou and was rescued by Ch'ao Kai who asked him to go to Liangshan for the purpose of assembling for justice, he was so furious that he flatly refused to do something that "is against the principle of Heaven and against the admonition of my father." He even accused Ch'ao Kai of trying to make him "disloyal and unfilial." When others wanted to free him from the fetters he held fast to his creed that the "laws of the state must not be tampered with." This

betrays his servile features. Despite repeated pleas by Ch'ao Kai and others, he remained unshaken in his convictions. Alternately he threatened to commit suicide and threw himself to the ground to make a scene, weeping and rolling on the ground. By making this revealing scene ,Sung Chiang caused considerable dismay to Ch'ao Kai and the other heroes. From then on Ch'ao Kai gained a deeper understanding of Sung Chiang.

It was rather unfortunate for Ch'ao Kai to be too concerned about "loyalty to friends." Since Sung Chiang informed him about the yamen's knowledge of the seizure of the birthday presents, Ch'ao Kai -- despite his strong aversion to Sung Chiang's sense of loyalty to the sovereign -- still took his men to the execution ground in Chiangchou to rescue Sung Chiang. It was then that Sung realized he would not be forgiven by the imperial court and saw no other choice but to go to Liangshan to seek temporary shelter. When the insurgent army under Ch'ao Kai's direction defeated the government troops holding Chiangchou, Li K'uei said happily: "With so many troops and horses at our disposal we have nothing to fear about a rebellion. Brother Ch'ao Kai will become the big emperor and Brother Sung Chiang the small emperor..... Let us march on Tungching and seize the damn throne. But enjoying ourselves there is no better than staying in this damn water margin!" This was something beyond Sung Chiang's wildest dreams. But because of Ch'ao Kai he had to restrain himself from getting angry at Li K'uei. He reluctantly joined the insurgent army for the purpose of making capital out of it in seeking the emperor's "pardon." If in the future he was to be given an official appointment he would then be able to add credit to his ancestors. On the other hand, Ch'ao Kai was pleased by what Li K'uei said and tacitly broke into laughter with the other heroes. As leader of the peasant uprising Ch'ao Kai harbored political aspirations. He opposed both the bureaucracy and the emperor and exemplified in himself the thoroughness of the peasant revolution. Ch'ao was firmly committed to following a rebellious line and this was radically opposed to the capitulationist line espoused by Sung Chiang, who was keen on seeking the "offer of amnesty and enlistment." This is the main reason why the author of "Water Margin" disliked Ch'ao. In Chapter 71, the author contrasted Ch'ao with Sung. He wrote, "In the case of Ch'ao Kai, he was aspiring to be a king and he died early. Sung Chiang, however, was ready to appeal to the following to defend justice and reigned over the stronghold as its leader." The two attitudes stood out in bold relief. Ch'ao Kai's ambition was to topple the whole feudal court and replace it with the political regime of the peasantry. Sung Chiang, however, pledged himself to defending what he called "loyalty and justice." This was in accord with the oath he took when he said, "It is my wish that we all bear in mind loyalty and justice and together render meritorious services to the country." What he meant by "appealing to the multitude to defend justice" was accepting the "offer of amnesty and enlistment" -- capitulating to the Sung Dynasty. Thus Ch'ao and Sung respectively represented two opposite classes, two opposite ideologies and two opposite lines.

Ch'ao and Sung likewise differed radically from each other in their approaches to the peasant uprising army. Ch'ao Kai understood the general scheme of things and had the overall situation in mind, always attaching importance to the interests of the peasant uprising as a whole. In the battle of Chiangchou he was at the head of his followers, shouting: "Once it is started, do not stop. With the assistance of all heroes, I, Kai, will wipe out all the troops in Chiangchou before returning to Liangshan!" What a heroic spirit. However, when Sung Chiang wanted to use the men of Liangshan to square personal vengeance, Ch'ao Kai immediately expressed disapproval of this adventure. He said, "Our combined action in mounting a surprise attack must not be repeated. This will only alert the treacherous villains." His integrity and uprightness made him regard the uprising cause above all other considerations. Immediately following his arrival at Liangshan Sung Chiang indicated he would go back home to fetch his family. Ch'ao Kai again expressed his disapproval on the ground that his followers were too tired to run the risk of moving Sung Chiang's family to the band's stronghold. In other words, the insurgent army must not be trapped because of one small family. This gave expression to the noble qualities of a peasant uprising leader. Sung Chiang on the other hand took a stand that was radically different from that of Ch'ao Kai and regarded the Liangshan insurgent army as a tool for serving his personal gain. He took the stand of the landlord class and exploited the weaknesses of the peasant insurgent army to win over a sizable following so he could recruit renegades and form factions for selfish ends. This he did for the purpose of trumpeting "loyalty and justice" and stirring up a reactionary adverse current within the uprising force. He excluded the staunchest revolutionary stalwarts like Li K'uei and the three Juan brothers by assigning them to low positions in the mountain stronghold, and installed in various key posts those class aliens and wavering elements who wormed their way into the revolutionary ranks. Fearing Ch'ao Kai's revolutionary determination, Sung Chiang dared not openly unfurl the capitulationist banner of accepting an "offer of amnesty and enlistment." Yet he always tried to exclude Ch'ao and used to say to him when problems arose: "You are the chief here, elder brother. Be cautious before taking any move." He used this open flattery to covertly oust Ch'ao and strip him of his power step by step. By the time Tsengtou city was under attack, Sung Chiang had grown in strength while Ch'ao Kai was no longer in a position to assume overall command. When Ch'ao came to the decision of attacking a fortress, he said to Lin Ch'ung grudgingly: "If I don't go myself, who will go forward?" As the leading general in Liangshan, Ch'ao should assume overall command and might not necessarily be required to go to every battle. However, many of his generals had been won over to Sung Chiang, reacted passively to Ch'ao Kai's battle orders, and were reluctant to forge ahead in battle. In these circumstances Ch'ao had to take the lead in combat actions. In a certain sense, it would seem more appropriate to say that Ch'ao Kai died as a result of the interference and sabotage of Sung Chiang's revisionist line rather than from Shih Wen-kung's poisoned arrow.

When Sung Chiang ascended the mountain, Ch'ao expressed his gratitude to Sung for running the risk of informing him of the arrival of government troops at Tungchi Village and repeatedly offered to make him the chieftain of the mountain stronghold. However, after subjecting Sung to a prolonged period of observation, Ch'ao's attitude toward him gradually changed for in the course of practice he increasingly realized that Sung was unreliable. What worried him most before he died was the fear that Liangshan's uprising cause might be wrecked by Sung. Therefore, before the assembled generals he left a will to Sung, which said: "Please excuse me for saying, younger brother, that the chieftain of Liangshan should be the one who captures the man who shot me with an arrow." As second in command, Sung Chiang logically should be the successor. Yet Ch'ao insisted that the one who captured his killer should be the master of Liangshan. Since Sung did not excel in martial arts and often remained at the rear in combat, he was no match for Shih Wen-kung who was a good hand in military exercises. In blunt terms, Ch'ao's will meant: "I object to Sung Chiang becoming the master of Liangshan!" What exactly occurred was that after Ch'ao's death Sung went revisionist. He changed Chü-i T'ing to Chung-i T'ang in anticipation of an offer of amnesty and enlistment.

In carrying out the two-line struggle against Sung, Ch'ao failed to acquit himself well and with determination because he was bound by a sense of loyalty to his friends. His will betrayed his contradictory frame of mind, such as his adherence to matters of principle and his fear of acting contrary to his sense of "loyalty to friends." His revolutionary slogan "act in concert and assemble for the great cause of justice" lacked a clearcut class concept. He thus played into the hands of Sung Chiang, who represented the interests of the landlord class. By changing the implied meaning of the word "I" /justice/ in terms of classes, Sung succeeded in evolving a capitulationist line geared to his scheme to form factions for selfish ends. To preach capitulationism the author of "Water Margin" harbored a strong sense of resentment against Ch'ao and was pleased to see him die. But he was particularly kind to Sung and often went out of his way to extol and embellish him. By deprecating Ch'ao in every possible way, the author thus elevated Sung. Because of this "Water Margin" proves to be a teaching material by negative example. It opens the eyes of all people as to who the capitulationists are and how they wreck the revolutionary cause.

The people are sharp-sighted. Despite the "Water Margin" author's elaborate efforts to misrepresent Ch'ao and Sung and reverse their roles, for centuries the readers of the novel have still liked Ch'ao Kai and detested Sung Chiang, looking upon the former as great and noble and the latter insignificant and mean. Therefore in the end, Ch'ao deserves to be called a hero of the peasant uprising while Sung Chiang is nothing more than a renegade who leaves his stench for ten thousand years. This is the conclusion of history.

* * *

On the Three Juan Brothers

by

Ch'en Ta-k'ang (陈大康)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

An old saying goes, "Driven to Liangshan Mountain." This is indeed true after reading "Water Margin."

However, the same case varies with different types of people. Some like Lu Chih-shen were driven to the Liangshan Mountain after they killed some people to help others out of a sense of justice. Some like Lin Ch'ung had no place to turn to after they were subjected to persecution. Some others like Kuan Sheng and Fu Yen-cho, who were formerly hangmen putting down peasant uprisings, were forced to surrender after their defeat. Still some others like Lu Chün-i, a tyrant and big landlord, was "lured" by Sung Chiang into going to the mountain stronghold. And then there were people like Sung Chiang who were driven to the Liangshan Mountain following their defeat in the dog-bite-dog fight within the landlord class. Despite the fact that these people were dissociated from the ruling camp their performance after they took to Liangshan was not the same. Some like Lu Chih-shen and Lin Ch'ung displayed firmness in their struggle. Some like Kuan Sheng and Lu Chün-i aspired to the Sung court in the hope of getting an offer of amnesty and enlistment though they were still in Liangshan. Sung Chiang in particular "sought temporary refuge in the body of water waiting for imperial amnesty and offer of enlistment." By carrying out a capitulationist line in the Liangshan insurgent army, he thus identified himself as a vicious worm in the revolutionary camp.

Another group of people were all different from those described above. They either came from poor families of farmhands such as Li K'uei or were poor fishermen, like Juan the Second, the Fifth and the Seventh. Long subjected to oppression under the feudal rule, they bitterly resented the landlord class. Defying the risk of suffering a thousand cuts, they dared to unhorse the emperor.

The three Juan brothers were fishermen from a lakeside village of Shihchieh in the neighborhood of the Liangshan Mountain. "Water Margin" portrays Juan the Second as "wearing a battered headwrap and an old coat and being barefooted." It depicts Juan the Fifth as "wearing askant a battered headwrap, with a pomegranate flower under it, and an old shirt" and Juan the Seventh as "wearing a black straw hat, a sleeveless coat made of cloth with a chessboard pattern, and a short skirt made of undyed yarn." Judging from their tattered clothing, they must have lived in poverty and privation. At that time the Juan brothers engaged in fishing in the body of water and it was inevitable that they would confront heavy "taxes." "Whenever the officials act in those affairs, the people suffer for it. For as soon as they come into the village they first seize the villagers' pigs, sheep, fowl and geese, and eat

them, and then demand money to cover the traveling expenses of their soldiers." Just as Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The brutal economic exploitation and political oppression carried out by the landlord class forced the peasants to rise in innumerable uprisings against the domination of the landlord class." Under the cruel exploitation of feudal rule the Juan brothers more clearly recognized the ferocious features of the feudal ruling class and therefore their will to resist was particularly strong. When they heard of the assembly of heroes in Liangshan Mountain for justice, they displayed a strong admiration for their militant life of "fearing neither Heaven nor earth, nor the officials" and said "if we learned their ways of living our life would not be so bad even a day!" Here, we can see the stand taken by the Juan brothers was diametrically opposed to that of Sung Chiang. While Sung advocated "carrying out the wish of Heaven" -- that is, following the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius on behalf of the throne, the Juan brothers "fear neither Heaven nor earth, nor the officials," meaning they completely ignored the emperor, the landlords and feudal officials. The firm revolutionary attitude of the Juan brothers underlined their strong aspirations after Liangshan Mountain. The brothers had "repeatedly discussed among themselves the matter of joining Liangshan." But on hearing that Wang Lun, the White Clothes Scholar, who held power on Liangshan, was a very narrow-minded man, who did not care to get many other capable and worthy men and practiced a closed-door line, the Juan brothers were "disinclined to approach him." They aspired to guidance and direction by a real peasant revolution leader and once told Wu Yung their resolve: "If somebody knew of our ability and asked us to go through water or fire we would not hesitate a moment to do so. If we were only employed for a day and were killed, we should still die contented." Therefore, when Wu Yung induced them to fall in with his plans to seize the birthday presents all the three brothers gave their hearty approval. "We have hoped for this a long time, and today we get our desires fulfilled. Your words scratch us at the place that itches." How fervent their revolutionary aspirations were!

After accompanying Ch'ao Kai and Wu Yung in the seizure of the birthday presents, the Juan brothers cleverly ambushed the government troops at the creek near Shihchieh Village and routed them. They captured Ho T'ao alive and this was indeed a great meritorious service even before they went to Liangshan Mountain. Bitterly scolding Ho T'ao, Juan the Second said: "You are just a minor official and even if Ts'ai the royal tutor dispatched men to seize us or if Ts'ai Ching himself personally came here, I would cut 20-30 holes in his body." The unambiguous attitude and resolute stand embodied in these words can be interpreted as the Juan brothers' thundering declaration of rebellion.

They went to Liangshan and joined the revolution. But life in the insurgent army did not live up to the expectations of the Juan brothers. Life which prevailed in the mountain stronghold was just one of "dividing the loot, gold and silver, silk and embroidered clothes, and feasting on wine and choice food." This was no militant life in fighting against government troops, a life for which the Juan brothers were mentally prepared. What complicated the problem was that there was

a two-line struggle within the ranks of the Liangshan uprising army. In Liangshan Mountain the Juan brothers were led by Ch'ao Kai to fight against the closed-door line pursued by Wang Lun and they won. By the time Sung Chiang was in the mountain stronghold, the struggle between the two lines, one for resolute struggle and the other for capitulation, unfolded with renewed violence.

Accompanying Ch'ao Kai through thick and thin, the Juan brothers went to Chiangchou to rescue Sung Chiang and escort him to the mountain stronghold as second in command. They did so in the hope that he would lead all the brothers to wipe out the enemy and consolidate and develop Liangshan's uprising cause. But what Sung Chiang did in Liangshan was exactly the opposite: he favored capitulationism instead of making revolution. Since at the time Ch'ao Kai was in charge and because the line he espoused had the support of a good number of revolutionary leaders, Sung sensed the moment was not ripe. Therefore, he never mentioned "amnesty and enlistment" before Ch'ao Kai. Behind Ch'ao's back, however, Sung never stopped stirring up an evil wind and fomenting trouble everywhere, never for a moment ceasing to carry out activities oriented to "amnesty and enlistment." For the purpose of preparing for surrender at a later period, he pushed an organizational line in the Liangshan stronghold of recruiting renegades and defectors and forming faction for selfish ends. He induced senior military officers of the feudal imperial court, owners of large farmsteads, hooligans as well as village despots and local tyrants to go to the mountain stronghold and installed them in key posts. Revolutionary generals like the Juan brothers, who closely adhered to Ch'ao Kai's revolutionary line, were suppressed and their military powers curbed in every possible way. After years of elaborate planning, Sung had grown in strength and became more and more arrogant. It was then that the capitulationist forces began to rear their heads in the mountain stronghold. When Ch'ao Kai was directing an assault on Tsengtou city, he said: "If I don't go myself who will advance?" These words indicate that Ch'ao's direction was then not very effective.

The struggle for Liangshan leadership very naturally affected the waterborne force, a most important military element as far as the body of water around Liangshan Mountain is concerned. Before Sung Chiang went to the mountain stronghold, the Juan brothers led this force to one victory after another and rendered significant meritorious services to the base that defended the revolution. Sung was a careerist and conspirator who excelled in usurpation of power. He therefore never entertained the idea of giving up this important front lightly. He brought along three henchmen to Liangshan. They were Li Chün, Chang Heng and Chang Shun, all being former local tyrants and despots. Chang Shun also dominated the fishing business in Chiangchou city. These people could have espoused revolution when they were excluded and their ambitions thwarted within the landlord class. It should be admitted that they had contributed in no small measure after they joined the peasant revolution. But comparing them with the Juan brothers who came of poor families of fishermen, they fell far behind in terms of firm attitude toward the revolution or contributions to the revolutionary

cause. Li Chün contributed nothing to the mountain stronghold. Yet when he appeared in Liangshan Sung Chiang placed him in a seat before those for the Juan brothers, who were more than once cited for significant merits. The seating order in the announced namelist of the leaders of the water-borne force at the time was: Li Chün, Juan the Second, Juan the Fifth, Juan the Seventh, Chang Heng and Chang Shun. Since the Juan brothers wholeheartedly pledged themselves to the revolution, bitterly hated the enemy and were by instinct opposed to taking the "offer of amnesty and enlistment" and to Sung's capitulationist line, it was natural that they incurred Sung's displeasure. When Ch'ao Kai was alive Sung always brought along the leaders of the water-borne force, Li Chün, Chang Heng and Chang Shun, to expeditions beyond Liangshan, leaving the Juan brothers in the mountain stronghold. Only when Sung launched an unsuccessful attack on Chuchiachuang and suffered reverses were the Juan brothers included in the reinforcements led by Wu Yung down the mountain stronghold. Sung's vicious tactics of wooing one faction to hit at another thus served to sow discord among the Liangshan generals and split and disintegrate their ranks. This also intensified the discord and divisions among the leaders of the water-borne force. When Kuan Sheng besieged Liangshan Mountain, Sung was leading his men outside while the leaders of the naval force were ordered to stay behind. Chang Heng then secretly told Chang Shun: "We two brothers haven't won any merit since we came to this stronghold, only watching other people bragging about their abilities and being snubbed by them." Judging from the Chang brothers' attempt to raid the enemy's camp without the knowledge of the Juan brothers, they were evidently referring to the Juan brothers. When later the attempt was aborted and Chang Heng was captured, Chang Shun called on the Juan brothers to make a complaint. On hearing this, Juan the Seventh jumped up and said: "We brothers were born and will die together, helping each other in weal or woe. You are his blood brother. How could you let him go alone and be captured? If you don't rescue him we three brothers will." Look, how the Juan brothers went out of their way to uphold the solidarity of the mountain stronghold while the Chang brothers, influenced by Sung's erroneous line, were motivated by selfish considerations and failed to have the general good in mind. Because of numerical inferiority the rescue effort of the Juan brothers likewise ended in failure. At this juncture, "Chang Shun jumped into the water before the others," leaving Juan the Seventh to be captured by Kuan Sheng. When Kuan Sheng interrogated Juan the Seventh and Chang Heng, Juan displayed the spirit of justice and severely scolded Kuan Sheng, while Chang Heng did not utter a single word. Where there is comparison there is distinction. This shows the two persons' attitude toward the cause of the peasant revolution and the varying degrees of their devotion.

To uphold feudal rule and oppose peasant uprisings, the author of "Water Margin" let Ch'ao Kai be killed by an arrow in Chapter 60. After Ch'ao's death Sung came to power. The first thing he did was to revise Ch'ao's revolutionary line and changed "Chu-i T'ing" to "Chung-i T'ang." Thus the capitulationist banner of "carrying out the wish of Heaven" was openly unfurled. In these circumstances those leaders who adhered to Ch'ao's revolutionary line were increasingly isolated, excluded and suppressed. Despite the Juan brothers' capture of Kuning

Thunder Ling Chen and Arrow Without Feathers Chang Ch'ing, who had fought against 15 Liangshan generals, the seating order for Liangshan heroes that led the water-borne force was: Li Chün, Juan the Second, Chang Heng, Juan the Fifth, Chang Shun and Juan the Seventh. Thus the seats for the Juan brothers were moved further backward. Sung was clearly responsible for this seating intrigue yet he explained this away by claiming that "Heaven's allocation of seats .... must not be disobeyed." A few days later Sung Chiang moved the seats for the Juan brothers behind those for Li Chün, Chang Heng and Chang Shun. When the Liangshan base was first set up the seats for the Juan brothers were among the first ten. But now they were seated in the back rows beyond the 30th seat while the seats for those who were forced to surrender, such as military officers of the feudal throne like Kuan Sheng, Tung P'ing, Chang Ch'ing and So Ch'ao, were moved forward way before those for the Juan brothers. Sung pursued this organizational line in the service of his politically-oriented capitulationist line.

Though suffering from exclusion, the Juan brothers remained undaunted in their fight against surrender. The emperor dispatched a grand general named Ch'en to Liangshan Mountain to "offer amnesty and enlistment." Sung was very pleased with this, but Juan the Seventh who was asked to escort the "emissary" put the visitor in a leaking boat and caused him great embarrassment. Furthermore, Juan the Seventh and the other generals of the water-borne force drank all the six bottles of "imperial wine" and filled the empty bottles with locally distilled inferior wine. When Ch'en the Grand General proudly invited all the leaders to drink the "imperial wine," the "Chung-i T'ang" was plunged into great disorder when the inferior wine was served. In the ensuing uproar the leaders almost killed the royal emissary, with the Juan brothers and others pouring abuse at him. Sung's plan to accept the "offer of amnesty and enlistment" thus fell through.

After Sung accepted the "offer of amnesty and enlistment," the Juan brothers never stopped struggling against Sung's capitulationist line. Following the Liangshan heroes' return from their attack on Wang Ch'ing, the imperial court decreed a ban on their "unauthorized entry into the city." The Juan brothers and other leaders of the water-borne force then asked Wu Yung to come to their boat and said to him: "The imperial court has no faith while treacherous ministers abuse their influence and block worthy men from approaching the throne..... Now we ask you, as military adviser, to make a decision, for the elder brother /Sung/ will surely object to what we propose to do. It is our intention to fight our way from here and ransack Tungching before returning to the Liangshan Mountain." These words amply show that the Juan brothers were prepared to unfurl a new banner of rebellion and expel Sung from the revolution. In this matter the leaders of the water-borne force acted in concert. Although Li Chün, Chang Heng and Chang Shun had Sung's confidence, they also became disenchanted with Sung and were ready to rise in revolt when they found they had been persecuted by the feudal court and inspired and encouraged by the revolutionary spirit displayed by the Juan brothers. Upon finding out what had occurred, Sung immediately assembled all the leaders and gave them a lecture on "loyalty" and "justice." He pretended to commit suicide to threaten the assembled leaders. Because the Liangshan brothers were blinded by

their sense of "justice" they "with tears in their eyes took an oath and left." Thus the revolutionary scheme conceived by the Juan brothers was torpedoed by Sung.

Following his surrender Sung became more enthusiastic in putting down peasant uprisings on behalf of the Sung imperial court. In attacking Fang La the Liangshan army suffered a series of reverses and the leaders perished in succession. Juan the Second also killed himself with a sword at Mount Wulung. The "Water Margin" author then viciously arranged for Juan the Fifth and Juan the Seventh, goaded as they were by a straitlaced sense of "taking revenge" and in order to take vengeance on their elder brother, to clash with Fang La's uprising army. Fang was in fact not the enemy of the Juan brothers but their class brother, while Sung, a revisionist chieftain who wormed his way into the revolutionary ranks of the peasant army to pursue a capitulationist line, was their real enemy. In "Water Margin's" denouement Juan the Fifth died in combat for no apparent reason. Only Juan the Seventh survived, but he was indeed a most pathetic figure.

Despite the "Water Margin" author's misrepresentations of the Juan brothers in an attempt to place Sung in a favorable light, he has provided us with some definite material by negative example. The revolutionary spirit displayed by the Juan brothers in resisting the landlord class and their fighting exploits have been remembered and extolled by the broad masses of the oppressed laboring people. "A Sequel to 'Water Margin'" by Ch'en Ch'en portrays Juan the Seventh returning to Liangshan to rebel. This conforms to the youngest Juan's character and follows its logical development. The Peking opera "The Fishermen Kill a Family," which appeared later as a crude adaptation of the narrative by Ch'en, reputedly changed the name of Juan the Seventh to Hsiao En. In that opera, however, Juan the Seventh is no longer able to display his former prowess, as he just drifts around and is unable to hold his ground. Both the father and daughter slew a local despot named Ting and his two henchmen and fled in a boat. But how far could the two go and where could they seek refuge? How could they break away from the dragnet of oppression by the feudal ruling class? From here, we can more deeply perceive the capitulationist line pursued by Sung Chiang and the harm it did to the revolutionary cause of the peasants. A hidden foe is more insidious than an open enemy. Failing to discern the deceit and danger of revisionism is bound to lead the mighty revolutionary undertaking to collapse and end in defeat. This tragic lesson deserves to be taken to heart by all revolutionary people.

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Sung Chiang's "Seditious Poem"

by

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In youth I studied hard the classics old,
As old I grew I fixed my mind intense.
Now like a tiger bold I hide in hole,
And lie with tooth and claw to await my chance.

My face was branded as a criminal,
And then to Chiangchou I was banished,
But soon the tide will turn; I'll have revenge,
And stain this spot with enemy's blood galore.

My body is in Wu; but heart in Shantung;
I float on sea and river like a weed;
I laugh at Huang Ch'ao whose fame is unsung,
For he just failed where I'll succeed.

Sung wrote the above seditious verses after he was drunk at the Hsunyang Inn partly to give vent to his personal grievances and partly to brag about his aspirations. They were later treasured by many who undertook studies on "Water Margin." These scholars interpreted the verses as "the strong voice of a peasant revolution leader dissatisfied with feudal rule" and as "a dagger thrust at the reactionary rule of the feudal imperial court." They practically extolled Sung Chiang to the skies.

Did Sung Chiang write a seditious poem? Even he himself denied it. After Huang Wen-ping copied down the poem and handed it to the prefect Ts'ai Chiu, Tai Tsung called on Sung and asked: "What did you write on the wall of the Hsunyang Inn the other day, elder brother?" Sung replied, "These are fantastic words. I wrote them when I was drunk." When Sung was taken to the prefect's yamen to be interrogated and tortured, he confessed: "I ought not to have written those seditious verses when I was drunk." After Huang Wen-ping was killed by the Liangshan Mountain heroes, Sung still blamed his drunkenness for endangering Tai Tsung's life. This is exactly how Sung attributed the poem to his excessive drinking.

Where there is comparison there is differentiation. Didn't Sung "laugh at Huang Ch'ao whose fame is unsung"? So let us compare the two persons. Huang, a prominent leader of peasant uprisings in the last year of the T'ang period in Chinese history, also wrote a seditious poem when he rose in rebellion:

On the eighth day of the ninth moon when the
chrysanthemum blossoms and all other flowers fall,
Sweet odor will pervade Changan and the whole
city will gleam with metal armor.

How the two poems differ from one another! Huang Ch'ao used the chrysanthemum to express his soaring ambitions and alluded to the "all other flowers" as the reactionary rule. His poem thus gives expression to the determination of a peasant revolution leader to fight against the feudal rulers to the finish. Sung's poem, however, expresses his mixed feelings -- taking pride in his erudition in Confucian classics and lamenting his frustrations after he had trespassed against the "laws" of the great Sung dynasty, his "failing to win fame and office." No wonder he "weeps" when he was writing that poem. What could he do? He had no choice but to "hide in the hole like a bold tiger" and "lie with tooth and claw to await my chance," willingly accepting banishment to Chiangchou. When Wu Yung, Liu T'ang and others urged him to go to the mountain, he said: "This is no way for you brothers to help me. You can only ruin me by making me disloyal and unfilial. If you force me to join you, you are only forcing me to die, and I might as well die." In his view, becoming a prisoner was better than becoming a "brigand." As a prisoner, he could still "return home from jail" some day. As a "brigand" on Liangshan, he would "go against the wish of Heaven and my father's admonition." Thus he closely linked his own destiny with that of the Sung imperial court. While Huang Ch'ao's poem is a clarion call of a peasant revolution hero, Sung's poem at best sounds like the whine of a "hungry dog" in the strife within the landlord class.

Sung's "soaring ambition" was in fact despicable. He once said to Wu Sung, "If the imperial court offers us amnesty and enlistment you can persuade Lu Chih-sen and Yang Chih to surrender. When later we are assigned to the frontier to defend the empire and share honors with our family members we shall fill niches in history and then we will not have lived in vain." His "soaring ambition" indeed never went beyond accepting offers of amnesty and enlistment and capitulating to the landlord class. His "laugh at Huang Ch'ao" was nothing more than "laughing" at Huang for giving up his life for the cause of the peasant revolution. This is all there was to it!

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A Comprehensive Review of Different Kinds of Opinions in the Studies of "Water Margin"

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

(I) Before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

1. General Appraisal of "Water Margin"

The first kind of opinion holds up "Water Margin" as a model for study as it reflects the revolutionary spirit of peasant uprisings and the idea of utopian socialism. A heroic epic, it should not be incorporated into the superstructure of feudal society. For instance, some say: By raising works like "Water Margin" to the orthodox position of Chinese literature and giving them a high evaluation, the "May 4" new cultural movement performed a great historical exploit. These works should be held up as models for study by our writers and artists. Others declare: The basic spirit of the book "Water Margin" is the revolutionary spirit of peasant uprisings. With such heroes as Sung Chiang as the mainstay, it gives a comprehensive description of China's social life in the middle ages, and a particularly profound and bold description of the contradictions and struggle between the peasantry and the landlord class, the revolutionary struggles, revolutionary strength and revolutionary ideas of the peasants. It shows the just struggle and aspirations of the people under the yoke of feudalist rule, while also reflecting the lack of thoroughness of peasants' revolutionary thinking and the defects shown in their revolutionary struggle. A work like this should not be incorporated into the superstructure of feudal society. Still others maintain that "Water Margin" is a heroic epic, an epic of peasant war, the first masterpiece of revolutionary literature in China's modern and ancient literature that provided the most complete description of peasant revolution, and a work that has so far not been matched by any similar work.

In addition, there are some people who believe that the great significance of "Water Margin" lies in its having a strong popular character and rich realism. The Liangshan heroes hoist in Chung-i T'ang an apricot yellow banner "carry out Heaven's wish," the "wish" being to be "a sworn enemy of the great Sung Emperor." There is also a body of opinion which holds that, taken as a whole, "Water Margin" uses the peasant thinking as the guiding thinking, which prevails during their revolutionary stage. As "Water Margin" reflects in a concentrated way the peasant class struggle, peasant uprisings and peasant wars that existed in feudal society, it naturally will, with its revolutionary ideological content, give a direct impetus to the resistance movement of the masses of people that still exists in society. It produces an uncalculably far-reaching influence on all sorts of actions taken by the masses of people against the feudal ruling classes in succeeding

generations. In the dark nights of feudal society, "Water Margin" not only gives immense inspiration to the later peasant revolution struggles and in no small measure ideologically arms later peasant insurgent forces, but at the same time it also provides valuable experience and methods of struggle for later peasant revolutionary movements.

The second kind of opinion is that the author of "Water Margin," having broken the feudal traditional concepts, persisted in describing the just struggle of peasant uprisings and took a negative attitude toward the offer of amnesty and enlistment. For instance, some people declare: The author of "Water Margin," while letting Sung Chiang utter such words of subterfuge as "I dare not rebel against the court," adopted a wholly sympathetic, affirmative and approving attitude in presenting these "rebels." The book "Water Margin" was written by a talented writer on the basis of collecting and processing the tales and legends formed over a long time among the masses of people. He stood on the side of the people and justice.

Others believe that the author, after breaking the bondage of the feudal orthodox concepts to a considerable extent, devoted all his enthusiasm and artistic and creative power to extolling and depicting this peasant insurgent movement, reflecting its real historical features. One must not pick only the question of Sung Chiang's setting out to fight Fang La or the name of this book "Chung I Shui Hu Ch'uan" (忠义水滸传) and slander the "compiler-writer of this novel" for "raping the will of this band of heroes in the woods."

Still others contend that while the author of "Water Margin" did not of course have a class viewpoint, his firm stand in being sympathetic to peasant uprisings, his sense of justice in differentiating between love and hate and his progressive ideological consciousness did enable him to truthfully project the feelings and sentiments and strong radiance of class struggle on this vast epic-like canvass.

In addition, there are people who hold that the merit of Shih Nai-an is that basically he took the stand of the people, sharing their joy and woe and ardently eulogizing the uprising struggle of the peasants. This is a basic attribute that distinguishes "Water Margin" from works by other men of letters, and this is also the most fundamental prerequisite for the great success attained by "Water Margin." Others take the view that a great epic of peasant uprisings, through up to a hundred years of fermenting and with the huge help of the author Shih Nai-an, finally attained a most glorious position in the history of literature. And it is the first time that such a solemn and great epic-type work appears in the history of Chinese literature.

The third kind of opinion holds that Chin Sheng-t'an did the right thing in "cutting" "Water Margin" insofar as this increased the popular and revolutionary nature of the novel. For instance, some people think that when Chin did not hesitate to cut it down and omitted such events as Sung Chiang's acceptance of the "offer of amnesty and enlistment" and his "attack on Fang La," his "attack on T'ien Hu" and

his "attack on Wang Ch'ing," we cannot say he did wrong. Although his edition manifested the reactionary thinking of the ruling class and between the lines smeared the hero Sung Chiang and cooked up a "nightmare" hoping that all Liangshan Mountain heroes would perish together, his treatment was such that the heroes leading the peasant uprisings would not betray their own class and surrender and compromise with the ruling class and it thus adds to the popular and revolutionary character of "Water Margin." Although the book was "expurgated" by Chin, he stopped with the "grand gathering of the Liangshan Mountain heroes," causing the reader to ponder over the invincibility of the revolutionary forces. This in itself is of tremendous educational significance.

2. Appraisal of Sung Chiang

The first kind of opinion is to regard Sung Chiang as a hero of peasant uprisings, as an embodiment of the qualities and features of the leaders of peasant revolution at that time. Sung Chiang's road is that of a revolutionary who is at once a loyal minister and filial son and a bad son and rebellious minister. For instance, some people declare: Sung Chiang in "Water Margin" impresses the reader the most largely as a hero of peasant uprisings, and such an impression does not change with the acceptance of the offer of amnesty and enlistment. Judging from the historical attitude, Sung projects a brilliant artistic image as one of the leaders of peasant uprisings in history, an image that reflects the revolutionary character of the peasantry. His revolutionary character is not only linked with the oppression he suffers, but is also tied to his ambition to be "a king and emperor," an ambition hidden in his heart as a leader of peasant uprisings. In feudal times, if a leader of peasant uprisings did not have the ambition to become an emperor, his revolutionary character also would not reach the height permitted by his time. Some people say that Sung was able to take the No. 1 position on the Liangshan Mountain not only because of his just acts -- which we must not overlook -- but because he was the Liangshan organizer. To be sure, if Sung did not appear, someone else would rise up to rebel, but it was because of him that the Liangshan people prospered and became ever stronger, in fact, largely inspired by his loyalty to friends. At the same time, owing to Sung's wise planning for offensives and defenses, each had his own job, gave his best and got what he needed on the mountain stockade. No wonder that the system he instituted was eyed by later generations as the ideal social system, and there was no exaggeration in saying this. As regards "carrying out Heaven's wish," the ignorant may look at it semantically. But long before that, "Shu Ching" had already said: "What Heaven sees the people see; what Heaven hears the people hear." Why, then, should one look at this phrase in a mechanical way?

Others believe that Sung Chiang's road is that of a rebel who was first born into a feudal family and served the feudal class but who later joined the peasant uprisings and finally was murdered by the feudal class, the road of a revolutionary who is at once a loyal minister and filial son and a bad son and rebellious minister. Still

others think that Sung Chiang's banishment and exile was actually a clarion call for heroes to assemble for an uprising. Sung's appearance on Liangshan marked the shift of the peasant insurgent army from occupying a piece of land to a direct offensive against the feudal rulers and the feudal landlord class. The development of Sung's character was closely related to the development and expansion of the Liangshan insurgent army. It was through the development of Sung's character that the author of "Water Margin" demonstrated the close unity and will of the insurgent army.

In addition, there are some people who think that as Sung is a "righteous man" and a "hero" within the ruling class who has not only talent and ambition but also close ties with the masses of the lower level, so after he went to Liangshan, he put forward a series of reform proposals (from slogans to organization and tactics), thus bringing about an unprecedented development in the revolution. The author, while describing the development and struggle of the Liangshan revolutionary army, also depicted Sung's capability to unite the masses, his loyalty to friends, and his fine qualities such as having a firm stand and observing revolutionary discipline in the course of concrete struggles (such as the three attacks on Chuchiachuang, the attack on Tsengtou city, the attack on Tamingfu, etc.). The author not only projected the image of "a revolutionary who had truly great ambitions and who tried to do something great in the manner of Huang Ch'ao," but also gave "convincing reasons why he was a revolutionary leader backed by the vast revolutionary masses." There are people who hold that in the opinion of Sung, not only were attacking cities and capturing prefectures, killing all corrupt and harsh officials and developing the forces of the Liangshan insurgent army acts of loyalty to the Liangshan revolutionary cause but winning the offer of amnesty and enlistment from the imperial court and practicing the capitulationist line was also an act of loyalty to that cause. The dual nature of the concept "Chung" in Sung's mind caused him unwittingly to do harm to his own class brothers, while he himself thought that he had led them to the right track.

There are also people who believe that as a leader of peasant revolutionary movement in feudal society, Sung Chiang's image was successfully presented. He was not only an important factor for the development and flourishing of the peasant insurgent cause but also an important factor leading to its degeneration and collapse. These two seemingly contradictory aspects were a unity of the two aspects of his character. Sung's character was of a dual nature from first to last: the entangling of resistance and compromise, the alternation of dominance of one over the other. Others contend that it was anything but fortuitous for Sung to become the Liangshan leader. He was one with the highest prestige among the leaders of the uprising, and his opposition to the persecution of the people by corrupt officials precisely represented the basic ideological tendency on the part of the overwhelming majority of the Liangshan heroes. On this ideological basis, his modesty and fraternal love, and his concern for his brothers enabled him to unite the Liangshan heroes to fight for a single cause. With his own talent

and foresight he was able to perform immortal exploits for the insurgent cause. He was clever and shrewd, good at applying correct tactics and making use of the enemy's contradictions to strike at him and to expand and vigorously develop the revolutionary cause. The organizational scale as prevailed on the Liangshan Mountain and the shining victories won in struggle against the enemy were all inseparable from Sung's brilliant organizational ability and art of leadership. As far as these aspects are concerned, Sung was a leader with great virtue and high prestige representing the fundamental interests of the Liangshan insurgent army. Still others are of the view that the flourishing of the Liangshan Mountain under the leadership of a correct political and military line cannot be viewed in isolation from Sung Chiang's presence. He was a leader that had been tested in mass struggles.

The second kind of opinion is to regard Sung's surrender as caused by practical conditions, a reflection of the nature of peasant revolution and showing Sung's progressive nature. In no way should the compromise and capitulation be blamed on Sung's leadership line. For instance, some people say: Viewed from the historical perspective, one of course can find opportunists and people who were wavering elements from the first who accepted various offers of amnesty and enlistment, but there were also staunch revolutionaries who ended up accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment either because they themselves committed mistakes or because they did so by force of circumstances. Sung's revolutionary character, as described in the first half of the novel, was determined both by actual circumstances and by the revolutionary strength of the peasants, and to attribute his failure or "tragic" ending mainly to the prevailing circumstances rather than to his inherent "wavering" can more profoundly illustrate the realities of history. Some people argue that in an analysis of the question of the insurgent army in the water margin accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment and taking the road of compromise, one should not simply ascribe these historical limitations to Sung's "leadership line." One should make full assessment of Sung's positive role in the insurgent army. Even Sung's so-called "compromise and capitulationist line" likewise reflected the feeble nature of the peasant insurgent army, as can be seen from its thought and banner of resistance. Some people think that Sung's weakness is the basic weakness of the peasant class, an unavoidable weakness of the general peasant movements in feudal society. One should not simply see Sung's family background and the influence of feudal education on him without seeing that the thought of accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment is one aspect of the lack of thoroughness of the peasant revolution in itself. We cannot make a demand on Sung Chiang from the level of modern thought, nor should we blame him for compromising and curse him for being a capitulationist and selling out the peasant revolution. This is because the peasant revolution itself is not thorough, this being the limitation of historical conditions.

Others think that accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment is not a question of an uncompromising revolutionary stand and Sung's

failure to carry the revolution through to the end, but a reflection of the essence of the peasant revolution, a reflection of the essence of the limitations of the time and history. In view of this, the acceptance of the offer of amnesty and enlistment should not be blamed on Sung alone. Prior to the offer of the amnesty and enlistment, two conflicting opinions had occurred within the insurgent force, but they did not lead to a struggle between the two lines. Sung's acceptance of the offer of amnesty and enlistment was a generalization of the compromising nature of the peasant revolution, a concrete reflection of the limitations of the peasant revolution in this specific uprising on the Liangshan Mountain.

In addition, some people argue that "Water Margin" most accurately reflects the historical limitations of the peasant uprisings through the projection of this tragic figure, Sung Chiang. While he was dissatisfied with corrupt officials and sympathetic toward the insurgents, he nevertheless entertained an illusion toward the supreme ruler. As a result, he did not think of breaking away from that system but had "the intent of being loyal to it." This capitulation is not negative, its aim being still to "carry out Heaven's wish and protect the country and people." Sung was not a careerist, he studied a problem on the basis of collective interests, he eagerly hoped that his brothers would find a way out. Although Li K'uei's slogan "fight all the way to Tungching and seize the damn throne" sounds great, it nevertheless simplifies the problem, for Liangshan did not have that strength. So, the other way out was to accept the offer of amnesty and enlistment. In the view of Sung and others, this implied cooperation with the supreme ruler and continuing struggle against corrupt officials. Sung intended to do good things but did the wrong ones; he served the insurgent army heart and soul, but had it undermined and destroyed. Such was his tragedy. Sung's line of accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment was wrong, but that was not enough to impair his heroic image as a leader.

3. The Question of "Amnesty and Enlistment"

The first kind of opinion holds that being "against corrupt officials only, but not the emperor" is an inherent thought of the peasants. The position of the peasants as an exploited class cannot be changed; they are content with appropriate exploitation and acknowledge the rationality of the feudal system and feudal ideology. So, accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment does not amount to selling out the revolution. For instance, some people say that, often entertaining various illusions toward the emperor and the ruling class, the peasant masses always hoped to have a good emperor, loyal ministers and good officials. More often than not they attributed the dark rule to "evil ministers" and "corrupt officials." This is an ideological reason of a historical nature for the peasant insurgent masses and leaders to accept readily such things as an offer of amnesty and enlistment. If at that time the feudal production relations in society were still consolidated and the feudalist ideological system was still a rational dominating force, to defend the feudal system with feudalist

ideology was something rational not only to the ruling class but to all people. Peasants generally did not object to an appropriate measure of exploitation, because they could still bear it, and the feudal society could still be sustained. And this was the only thing people could expect in those days. The position of the peasants as an exploited class could not be changed. Some people therefore think that supporting the emperor and opposing corrupt officials was the common thought of the peasants, a thought which was closely related to the diversity and ignorance of small producers in the environment in which they lived and to conservative concepts. Killing the feudal officials and "repaying the Chao throne with loyalty" were originally two mutually contradictory thoughts, but to the peasants they were a unity. This thought of unity of opposites pervaded their militant actions all along. This was consistent with the contradictoriness of Sung's tragic thought -- on the one hand fighting against the feudal imperial court, on the other pinning the hope on the emperor's offer of amnesty and enlistment. Others say that Sung's peasant revolutionary thought is typical: He wanted neither to overthrow the emperor nor to become an emperor himself. His thought represented the thought of the great majority of the heroes at Liangshan and also represented the thought of the majority of the peasants at that time. There are also people who think that under the system of feudal autocracy, not only did the ordinary men of letters in society have the thought of being loyal to the emperor but even the broad peasant masses, influenced by feudal orthodox morality, more or less had the same thought. If we look at a problem from the viewpoint -- "oppose the bureaucrat landlords and support the good emperor," it is possible to understand why Sung eventually took the road of accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment. The position of the peasants in production made it impossible for them to put forward and realize a kind of system more advanced than the feudal system. The thought of being loyal to the emperor in "Water Margin" is exactly a reflection of such historical limitations.

The second kind of opinion is to regard the acceptance of the offer of amnesty and enlistment as a limitation of the peasantry, the inevitable outcome of peasant revolutionary war. The initiative shown in accepting such an offer is a reflection of the powerful might of the peasant revolution. For instance, some people say that accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment generally reflects the shortcomings and weaknesses of the peasant uprisings, but under no circumstances should the acceptance of such an offer be regarded as a sell-out of the revolution in all cases. Problems like accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment are related to the lack of thoroughness in the revolutionary thinking of the peasants and the various drawbacks in struggle. When peasant uprisings, suffering from suppression and deception by the ruling classes, became wavering or were on the verge of failure, ideas such as that of accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment might even turn into a popular tide, and, as it were, imply the effect of disruption by saboteurs and, to a greater extent, the defeatist moods of the masses. Some people think that "accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment" and "setting out to fight Fang La" were precisely one of the possible endings of the water margin heroes. As dictated by the law of revolutionary war by peasant insurgent forces, its historical inevitable

outcome was this: either the insurgents were suppressed and slaughtered or they compromised, surrendered and degenerated. The inexorable law of historical development cannot but form the structure of the tragic ending of "Water Margin." The tragic ending of the water margin heroes thus precisely shows the realistic attitude of the author, and this in no way reduces the book's value. Sung's compromising character is not merely his alone but represents the overall tendency of the peasant insurgent forces. Others argue that "Water Margin" may be said to reflect in a most comprehensive way the concrete road which peasant insurgency takes toward defeat; in other words, "Water Margin" reflects, in literary form, the inevitability of the failure of the peasant revolution. Only when the two parts -- "accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment" and "setting out to fight Fang La" -- are added is it possible for "Water Margin" to become a complete work realistically presenting the peasant revolutions in feudal society. Still others hold that the fact that "Water Margin" ends with "accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment" and "setting out to Fang La" is determined by the inexorable law of that historical period in which "Water Margin" is set and by the demands of the story itself. Under the historical conditions of the time that "Water Margin" reflects, there can only be one ending for peasant uprisings such as that of Liangshan.

Besides, there are people who say that the historical fate of defeat suffered by the peasant revolution led by Sung Chiang is but another special form of expression of the failure caused by the acceptance of the "offer of amnesty and enlistment." Others assert that it was practically impossible for Sung not to compromise but to carry the revolution through to the end and refuse the "offer of amnesty and enlistment." The tendency to compromise is another characteristic of the peasant revolution, a characteristic which is closely related to the lack of consciousness of the peasant revolution. Still others contend that since peasants were small property owners engaged in individual production and for a long time were poisoned by feudal ideology, they could not see far enough and consequently cherished illusions toward the rulers. There were only two roads for the future of the peasant uprisings: either be destroyed or to accept the offer of amnesty and enlistment; there must be one or the other. This is a fact of history.

The third kind of opinion holds that accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment reflects the wishes of the people to resist foreign aggression and implies patriotism and national consciousness. Some people, for instance, believe that under aggression by foreign nations, accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment is also a wish of the people. For this reason, it is both inevitable and necessary for Sung to accept the offer. Others maintain that Sung's acceptance of the offer should be described more as an expression of national consciousness than an expression of the thought of "being loyal to the empror." Still others contend that the fact that the author let the Liangshan heroes choose the road of accepting the "offer of amnesty and enlistment" as their final destination is not only because this is an historical fact but also because the people at that time, hating the foreign aggressors, yearned for such heroes as the Liangshan ones to come forward to defend the country.

The fourth kind of opinion asserts that the part on accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment in "Water Margin" is intended not to propagate capitulation but to criticize it. For instance, some believe that although the author wrote of Sung's surrender, he nevertheless did not propagate surrender but told the readers: "Surrender is a blind alley!" He then went on to describe the tragic ending after the offer of amnesty and enlistment was accepted, thus creating the impression among the readers to the effect that: "To rebel is justified, to accept the offer of amnesty and enlistment is to invite disaster." This is meant to tell people that: to survive, they must resist, for accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment is no way out. The reason why the ruling classes regarded this novel as "pernicious" and repeatedly had it banned is precisely that they saw its tremendous influence. Others hold that "Water Margin" criticizes the question of accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment not with theories but with facts. This is to say that "Water Margin" uses concrete facts to negate the initiative taken by Sung to win the offer of amnesty and enlistment.

4. At That Time There Were Also Some Commentaries Which, Under the Premise of Affirming "Water Margin," Advanced Certain Conflicting Views on Sung Chiang and the Question of "Amnesty and Enlistment"

The first kind of opinion holds that Sung Chiang took a progressive step when he went to the Liangshan Mountain and joined the peasant insurgent army there to take the road of open resistance, and made certain contributions to the growth of that insurgent army. However, in the history of peasant revolutions in China over the past 2,000-3,000 years, while there were thousands and thousands of heroes who performed heart-warming deeds and sacrificed their lives valiantly, capitulationists and renegades could be counted by the fingers. How can one close his eyes and describe Sung's surrender as a manifestation of the limitations of the peasantry? If one does so, would he not sling mud at the peasantry? Others argue that even though the acceptance of the offer of amnesty and enlistment might be taken as a reflection of one future of the peasant revolution, at least the result meant that the peasant revolutionaries "surrendered" to the feudal rulers, and the outcome of the peasant uprisings in history was in most cases not that "they accepted the offer of amnesty and enlistment" but that they were often brutally suppressed by feudal rulers who took advantage of the weaknesses of the peasant revolution. Had the author of "Water Margin" chosen this line of description, he might perhaps be able to more profoundly and truthfully point to the inevitable failure of the peasant revolution while reflecting its greatness. Others think that we must not judge a person by his success or failure, but we must not relax our struggle against and our effort to settle score with the capitulationist tendencies shown in historical events. Take, for example, Fang La, Sung's contemporary. He fought almost to the last man and died after he was captured. He was worthy of being called an outstanding peasant leader. Although he failed, we still accord him the greatest respect and sympathy. Sung's acceptance of the emperor's "offer of amnesty and enlistment" and his "loyalty" to the court, which caused the complete defeat of the Liangshan uprising, are something we must criticize in depth.

The second kind of opinion holds that the theory that to "attack Liao," they must first accept the "offer of amnesty and enlistment" proceeded from the reactionary viewpoint of the feudal rulers who claimed that "to resist foreign aggression, the country must first be pacified internally." Thus it preached capitulationism. The inevitable defeat of peasant uprisings in feudal society is an historical tragedy, resulting from the most hideous and dirtiest crimes perpetrated by the reactionary ruling classes. But "inevitable defeat" did not mean inevitable "acceptance of the offer of amnesty and enlistment." Judging by formal logic, some people substituted the concept "accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment" for the concept "defeat," largely because they took the stand of the bourgeoisie and landlords. Judging from "Water Margin," the author's world outlook suffered considerable limitations. Although he sympathized with the Liangshan peasant insurgent forces and saw "the people's rebellion" as caused by "official corruption," nevertheless he consistently depicted the people of Liangshan, particularly Sung Chiang, their leader, as people who were loyal to the supreme ruler.

(II) Since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

1. Comments on "Water Margin" and Its Author

The first kind of opinion holds that "Water Margin" is a work distorting peasant uprisings and advocating a capitulationist line, and that therefore it must be analyzed and criticized. For instance, some people think that "Water Margin" twists the true historical facts about Sung Chiang's uprising, casts Sung Chiang, the leading and artistic image of the whole book, in a role according to the calculations of the landlord class, and trumpets an overwhelming capitulationist line. Insofar as the author praises the capitulationist line, "Water Margin" is a novel distorting the peasant uprising. From the fact that the author is in favor of the Sung Chiang-type "rebellion" and opposes that of Fang La who wanted to "change the style of an emperor's reign" and "found his own empire," thereby negating the peasant uprisings in the Sung Dynasty, it can be seen that the author hopes to see the world ruled by "a wise monarch -- loyal ministers -- honest officials." But this was merely an illusion cherished by the middle and small landlords toward reforming the feudal political structure. They also point out that the idea of "loyalty to friends" vigorously trumpeted in "Water Margin" is the tactical basis for Sung to push the capitulationist line. Others believe that the author's world outlook is clearly stamped with the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, and that it is precisely the Confucian concept of "loyalty and justice" that causes him to make such a portrayal of Sung. Nor is "Water Margin" a good book, so we must analyze and criticize not only Sung but also the novel itself.

Another kind of opinion takes the position that "Water Margin" is a great work because it and its author ardently praise the peasant uprisings, a great work one cannot negate even if one wants to. For instance, some people, disagreeing with the above-mentioned views, contend that "Water Margin" not only depicts the peasant uprisings but also tells the basic cause of the peasant uprisings: "The government forces the people to rebel," "rebellion is caused by corruption in high places." It not only has deep

sympathy for but also warmly eulogizes those heroes who are afraid of neither Heaven nor the earth and who do not fear the government and even the emperor himself. Before the appearance of "Water Margin," there was no literary work that presented such a clearcut revolutionary and profound democratic character. Although the author is sympathetic toward Sung for accepting the "offer of amnesty and enlistment," nevertheless he does not entirely approve it -- this in itself a criticism of Sung's taking the "offer of amnesty and enlistment." At the same time, judging by the social effects, "Water Margin" produced a tremendous positive influence on peasant uprisings in the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. There are also some who hold that a work like "Water Margin," which with its lofty tune, magnificent spirit and abundant warmth extols the peasant uprisings, must be as immortal as the peasant uprisings and can in no way be negated.

The third kind of opinion holds that "Water Margin" is not a Confucian work that gives the main emphasis to the publicity of feudal ideology, but a novel reflecting the interests of the towns people, and it is a mistake either to wholly affirm or negate it. Some people believe that among the 108 generals portrayed in "Water Margin," only one is a peasant, that is, T'ao Tsung-wang in Chapter 41, who was born of a peasant family and able to wield a hoe. The remaining 107 people were small traders selling mercury, sheep and horses, handicraftsmen, singers and artists, yamen officials, frustrated scholars, practitioners of medicine, Taoists, fishermen who "conducted smuggling in the marshland," "loafers," lower-ranking army officers guilty of offense, generals of the imperial court, "descendants of royal blood" reduced to destitution," etc..... Li K'uei was stranded in Chiangchou after killing a man and became "a small prison guard," anything but a peasant. Therefore, it may be said that the insurgent army in "Water Margin" does not have the peasant style of living, nor does it have the peasant demand for land. So, "Water Margin" is not a Confucian work giving the emphasis to publicizing feudal ideology, and in respect to its attack on feudal ideology, it performs indelible historical merit. But neither is it a work that gives the emphasis to depicting peasant uprisings or gives expression to the revolutionary thinking of the peasantry. It is a novel reflecting the interests of the towns people.

2. Appraisal of Sung Chiang

The first kind of opinion holds that Sung Chiang is in every sense a leader of peasant uprisings, his seditious poem marking a new starting point for his change of mind and the beginning of a revolutionary life. For instance, some people think that in the historical social relations where Sung lived, there were two completely different worlds: One was the world of the upper-rank officials, the other was the world of roving adventurers of the lower strata. In the early period, Sung's mind was dominated by the idea of loyalty to friends. After he went to the mountain, as the objective situation was extremely favorable to the development of the insurgent army and as he had definite prestige, experience and ability, the mountain stronghold was indeed getting more and more prosperous with each passing day. Therefore, Sung's thinking and character were complicated and

full of contradictions. He had the trait of revolution and resistance, a trait which was later strengthened; but he also had the trait of weakness, compromise and oscillation, a trait which was particularly serious during the early period. However, his seditious poem written in Hsunyang Inn marked a new starting point for the change in his thinking and character, although the change was anything but radical. The great tide of peasant uprisings washed Sung out of the circle of petty officials of the feudal landlord class, and then he began his revolutionary career. And as he had a definite organizational and military talent, he won the backing of the Liangshan heroes. He personally directed the three attacks on Chuchiachuang, the night raid against Tsengtou city, and the battle to storm Tamingfu, heavily battering the government troops of the feudal ruling class and the armed forces of the counter-revolutionary landlords and dealing a stunning blow to the reactionary rule of the feudal class. In short, even though Sung had many serious shortcomings and mistakes, he still retained in every sense the image of a leader of the peasant uprisings.

Another kind of opinion looks upon Sung as a renegade from the peasant revolution, one who pushes the capitulationist line. Some people, for instance, believe that although Sung had contradictions with big landlords and big bureaucrats, his basic interests were identified with theirs. The contradictions between them were partial, temporary and non-antagonistic. They all belonged to the feudal landlord class, exploiting and oppressing the peasantry and being hostile to and suppressing peasant uprisings. After Sung was rescued from the execution ground in Chiangchou and joined the peasant insurgent ranks, this did not mean that he had completely broken away from the feudal landlord class to which he originally belonged, nor did it mean that he had made a radical rupture with the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius rooted in his mind. It is inconsistent with facts to say that "Sung from then on led a revolutionary life." As to the "seditious poem" he wrote while being drunk in Hsunyang Inn, its essence was to ridicule Huang Ch'ao for not being "a big man," for missing the golden opportunity to accept the imperial court's offer of amnesty and enlistment and to "perform merit to have his name passed down." It derided Huang Ch'ao for upholding the revolutionary character of struggle. His desire to have "blood stain the water at the mouth of Hsunyang River" meant nothing more than that he intended to gain a position of strength by using the forces of the peasant uprising and use it as capital for achieving his "soaring ambition." It was precisely because Sung regarded his participation in the peasant uprising as a special way to the ideal world where he could attain fame and wealth with his loyalty and filial piety that he carried out a compromising and capitulationist line on the Liangshan Mountain. At best he was a fellow traveller of the peasant insurgents. In "Water Margin," it was not the peasant insurgents who reformed Sung Chiang, it was he who transformed the correct line of the peasant insurgents and reversed their general orientation.

In addition, some believe that when Sung "sat on the No. 1 chair" following Ch'ao Kai's death and changed "Chu-i T'ing" to "Chung-i T'ang," this "rectification of name" symbolized the gradual ascendancy of his compromising and capitulationist line with "chung" as its kernel. Particularly when the erroneous line represented by Sung gradually took the dominating position, the situation worsened still more. The grand

assembly of the 108 people on Liangshan appeared on the surface to be a spectacular scene; in reality, however, some alien class elements had already usurped a considerable part of power and the reactionary forces had become viciously inflated. Furthermore, Sung arbitrarily dragged the rich merchant and big landlord of Peiching, Lu Chün-i, into Chung-i T'ang and made him No. 2. This was an organizational line that served the compromising and capitulationist political line. Others hold that taking a sweeping glance at the history of Chinese peasant revolutions, there had never been, nor could there be, a peasant uprising which took winning the offer of amnesty and enlistment as its target. Peasants in feudal society might suffer from this or that limitation, but they had never suffered from the limitation of compromise and capitulation. The revolutionary tendency is the most important essence of the peasantry. Therefore, it is not that the class position of the peasants limited Sung, but that Sung reacted against the peasantry.

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Further Strengthen Party Building

- Some understanding from studying "Introducing the Communist"

by

Fang Hai (方 海)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

To go on strengthening Party building is dictated by the ceaseless deepening of revolutionary struggle. The development of revolutionary struggle demands that we build the Party into a Marxist-Leninist party, fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally, capable of effectively leading the proletariat and the revolutionary people to accomplish revolutionary tasks for various historical periods. As early as October 1939, Chairman Mao pointed out in "Introducing the Communist" that after 18 years of struggle, our Party "is already a bolshevized party, consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally." But with the development of the revolution, the situation in which the Party finds itself and the tasks thrust on it have changed considerably. This requires that the Party must go on building itself so as to adapt to changing situations. Our country is now in a crucial period of historical development, faced with the great task of exercising all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie. Only by continuously strengthening Party building can our Party organizations at various levels shoulder the historical mission of leading the broad masses of people to carry out socialist revolution and construction.

As Chairman Mao pointed out clearly, the process of Party building is "closely linked with its political line." "An organizational adjustment must first be preceded by an ideological adjustment, a struggle waged by the proletariat against non-proletarian ideas." In the socialist historical period, in order to strengthen the ideological and political building of the Party, we must persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and unfold a struggle between the two classes, two roads and two lines in accordance with the Party's basic line for the historical stage of socialism. The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political lines decides everything. The two-line struggle within the Party is the deepest manifestation of class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the revisionist elements within the Party are bourgeois agents within our Party. Chairman Mao's recent important instruction on the question of theory presented an in-depth analysis of the class causes and social basis for the engendering of revisionism within the Party. It pointed out that due to the existence of classes, class contradictions and class struggle and bourgeois rights in the period of socialism, new bourgeois elements may still continue to emerge from among a part of the Party members, and "both within the ranks of the proletariat and among the personnel of state organs there are people who follow the bourgeois style of life." Chairman Mao also warns the whole Party that because soil breeding capitalism still exists, if people like Lin Piao

should come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system. This clearly shows that there is still the danger of China turning revisionist. It is therefore a vital task on the ideo-political front to combat and prevent revisionism, and to criticize revisionism and capitalist tendencies in various forms.

An important aspect of strengthening the political and ideological building of the Party in the course of class and line struggles is to teach all Party members to go on criticizing the bourgeois world outlook, persistently use the proletarian world outlook to transform ourselves and increase their ability to distinguish genuine from sham Marxism. Therefore, we must step up education on proletarian Party spirit among Party members, stressing the need to run the Party for public and not private interest. We resolutely oppose people like Lin Piao who form cliques to seek personal interests or the interests of a small group. We tolerate no activities within the Party aimed at splitting it, activities to woo some people and reject others, to flatter and bribe, to spread rumors, to stir up sinister wind and fire. However adept they were at playing tricks to split the Party and its Central Committee, Lin Piao and his gang of clowns could not but finally expose their hideous features and end up totally discredited. Early in the rectification campaign in 1942, Chairman Mao severely criticized sectarianism within the Party and various incorrect Party styles running counter to proletarian Party spirit. He said: "Our Party is no longer dominated by sectarianism. Remnants of sectarianism, however, are still found both in the Party's internal relations and in its external relations. Sectarian tendencies in internal relations lead to exclusiveness toward comrades inside the Party and hinder inner-Party unity and solidarity, while sectarian tendencies in external relations lead to exclusiveness toward people outside the Party and hinder the Party in its task of uniting the whole people. Only by uprooting this evil in both its aspects can the Party advance unimpeded in its great task of achieving unity among all Party comrades and among all the people of our country." To strengthen Party building, we must eliminate the remaining pernicious influence of the revisionist line espoused by Lin Piao and company and adhere to the basic principle put forward by Chairman Mao, "Practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire." We must use the Party's fine style to defeat the incorrect styles within the Party, and it is only in this way that our Party can march in step and unite with and lead the people of the whole country to triumphantly advance along Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and further promote the excellent situation of stability and unity.

To build up the Party politically and ideologically, it is essential to educate Party members to weather storms, see the world, increase their ability to distinguish between right and wrong in storms and waves, and raise their ideological and line consciousness. Chairman Mao teaches us: "Where there is comparison, there is differentiation. Where there is differentiation and struggle, there is development." Without contradictions, the world will cease to exist. Truth exists in comparison with falsehood and develops in struggle against it. Without negative things to serve as comparison, a deep understanding of positive things is impossible. Marxism emerged and has developed in struggle against

opportunist and revisionist ideas of all kinds. Our Party has grown and expanded precisely in struggles against the "Left" and Right opportunist lines of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chü Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-t'ao, P'eng Te-huai, Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. Without 10 line struggles within the Party, there would have been no Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the Party would not have developed and consolidated itself. Class and line struggles exist objectively. The bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie must reflect their ideology; they must stubbornly express themselves through various means politically and ideologically. For this reason, we definitely must not be afraid of contradictions nor evade them. Instead, we should recognize them, acquire the skill to wage struggle in the ideological area, correctly distinguish and handle the two different types of contradictions, grasp the Party's policies and criticize and overcome revisionist ideas of all kinds. If we show no concern for the struggle between opposites and prevent people from meeting idealism, bourgeois ideas and various erroneous thoughts, we naturally cannot properly build up the Party politically and ideologically but can weaken the fighting power of the Party. Thoroughgoing materialists have nothing to fear. When we Communists fight for socialism and communism, we are not afraid of setbacks and we are not afraid that some people may discuss and laugh at us or make criticism and suggestion to us. Even poisonous weeds can be dug up and turned into manure, and the result can only help us broaden our horizon and temper and improve our ability to distinguish right from wrong.

Thorough implementation of a correct ideological and political line has to be guaranteed by a correct organizational line. Therefore, while paying serious attention to building the Party politically and ideologically, we must seriously grasp the organizational building of the Party. However, the organizational line is subordinated to the ideological and political line, and in Party building, we must put ideological and political building in command of organizational building. For instance, building and rounding out leading groups at various levels of the Party is not just an isolated question of organizational building, still less a question of considering the composition of membership, but is, first of all, a question of how to properly adjust the ideological and political line. Hence, we must stress the need to read and study seriously, to read avidly works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Chairman Mao, to penetratingly initiate investigations, to raise our ideological and line consciousness and policy level. Only thus can we assuredly make the leading body into a fighting headquarters full of vigor and vitality.

In consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and doggedly continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, one of the basic things to do is to further build up our Party according to the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and revolutionary style. We must act in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions and, while studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, make clear both in theory and in practice the relationship between Party building and the consolidation of proletarian dictatorship, exert further effort to build up the Party, and enable our Party organizations at all levels to become strong bastions

leading the broad masses in exercising all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie and all Party members to become vanguard fighters continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must carry on the fight, from generation to generation, for the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and for the ultimate realization of communism.

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Educate Party Members To Take the Lead in Continuing the Revolution

by

The CCP Committee of Wuching Thermal Power Plant, Shanghai

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

Educating Party members to take the lead in doggedly continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat is an important aspect of strengthening the ideological building of the Party. According to our understanding during the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship, to do this entails the need to uphold the progressive character of the proletarian vanguard and to give full play to the vanguard exemplary role of Communist Party members. This is to enable them to firmly foster the idea of being prepared for a long period of fighting for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the realization of communism.

Judging from the conditions of our plant, the overwhelming majority of Party members, ever since they joined the Party, decided to dedicate themselves to the struggle for communism. Especially through the great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, this resolution has become still firmer. They are in the fore in studying the works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Chairman Mao, in class struggle, in doing hard work and in transforming thinking. They are vigorously leading the masses of workers to fight at the first line of the three major revolutionary struggles. However, due to a lack of seriousness in study and a low consciousness, some Party members, whenever they talk about communism, used to feel that "this is a theoretical matter far removed from us!" When assigned to difficult jobs, they feel that "this is a heavy load to be shared by all, and it wouldn't make much difference if I alone do not participate." They even develop the mood that "if the job is done, it doesn't matter how you may do it." This "half-baked" revolutionary idea of standing still and seeking no more progress means, in the final analysis, that one who has it forgets the great task of continuing the revolution and the basic program and ultimate aim of the Party.

To counter this notion, during the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship, we lay the stress on giving the Party members education on the nature and tasks of the Party as well as communist ideals and future. This enables them to recognize that a Party member who has done well and is relatively good also has the problem of continuously raising his Marxist level and raising his consciousness of combating and preventing consciousness. If we relax our effort to read and study, we will fail to distinguish right from wrong, we will lose our bearings, to say nothing of continuing the revolution. It is deeply recognized that this grand goal of communism cannot be realized overnight but calls for the continuous efforts of several generations. We "are presently heading toward this grand goal. If we lose sight of it, we are no longer Communists. But if we relax our efforts today, we are not Communists

either." Therefore, we must broaden our vision and look far ahead. In building socialism today, we must think of communism tomorrow. We must be seen to have set up the thought of dedicating our lives to the realization of communism.

To persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must lead Party members to free themselves from the confines of small production ideas and the bondage of the idea of bourgeois rights. For instance, some comrades entertain the idea of "work according to pay." They are unwilling to do a little more or receive a penny less than others. Whatever they do, they first find out what good it would do them. There are others who have a weak Party concept; they want special treatment from the organization but not its discipline; they want personal freedom but not disciplinary restraint. Still others are only content with "living an honest, good,peaceful life." The influence of these ideas of small producers poses a serious obstacle to Party members in persistently continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only when this influence is unceasingly eradicated can they pluck up their revolutionary spirit. To this end, we organize Party members to seriously study the revolutionary teachers' teachings on the need for Communists to emancipate the whole of mankind and to criticize the reactionary philosophical ideas trumpeted by Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, such as "having more selfish desires is something natural" and "he who does not work for himself, Heaven destroys." Meanwhile, using the method of comparing the past and present, persuasion and education, criticism and self-criticism, we enable these comrades to raise their consciousness, free themselves from the narrow confines of small producers, and see the grand goal of communism. Facts show that only by making the most radical rupture with the traditional property relations and traditional concepts, by smashing the ideological joke, and by really solving the problem of completely joining the Party in an ideological sense is it possible for them to work for the well-being of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people and the world's people heart and soul.

Intrusion by the bourgeois style of thinking is an important factor interfering with the continuation of the revolution by Party members. Before joining the Party, some Party members in our plant worked like tigers. After joining the Party, due to lax ideological reform, they gradually lost their resistance in face of the attack by bourgeois ideology and even developed to the stage where they took themselves as commodities. Although such people who regard Party membership as a means of attaining personal fame and gain are very few, they have nevertheless sounded the alarm for us. So we have everyone recall and sum up the historical lessons from mistakes made by a few Party members both in society and in our plant. This makes them see that creating a gap in life and using sugar-coated bullets in an attack against the proletariat is one of the important means employed by the landlord and bourgeois classes to corrupt the proletariat and to bring up and engender new bourgeois elements within our own ranks. Should we lose our vigilance against the attack of the bourgeoisie, we will fight a losing battle in face of sugar-coated bullets. With a view to helping activists who are striving for Party membership to adjust their motive for joining the Party and to

giving all Party members education, we organized Party members to hold a meeting to discuss "why join the Party?" by way of summing up positive examples and dissecting negative ones. The result was to make everyone really understand that "the Communist Party is a political party working for the welfare of the nation and the people and having nothing to gain for itself." In addition, the comrades took the initiative to find out how the bourgeoisie tries to corrupt the proletariat under the new situation. For instance, when you have achieved something in work, the bourgeoisie will flatter you; when you have power, they will woo you with flattery, invitation to dinner and gifts; when you get a promotion, they will corrupt you by offering you with money and beautiful women, and so forth. Thus all the Party members have been enabled to further raise their consciousness of combating and preventing revisionism and to realize the importance of persistently continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The movement to study the theory of proletarian dictatorship, which is deepening at present, is a most intensive and extensive Marxist education movement, whose fundamental aim is to combat and prevent revisionism and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. Every Party member who vows to devote his life to the struggle for communism must take this theory as the guiding thought and be resolved to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat to the very end.

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The Struggle Between Two Military Lines in the War To Liberate the Central-South

- A critique of Lin Piao's Right military line during the war to liberate the Central-south region

by

T'ang Ssu-wen (唐思汶)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 8, August 18, 1975)

In the revolutionary campaign to liberate the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi in the Central-south region after our million-strong mighty army crossed the Yangtze River, Chairman Mao's proletarian military line clashed sharply with Lin Piao's bourgeois military line. The Central-south region was speedily liberated through Chairman Mao's wise strategic planning and after the commanders and fighters of the Fourth Field Army firmly carried out Chairman Mao's directives and orders to get over the interference of Lin Piao's Right opportunism. The victory of the battles to liberate the Central-south was the result of Chairman Mao's proletarian military line defeating Lin Piao's bourgeois military line.

I

The three big campaigns -- Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-hai and Peiping-Tientsin -- wiped out the Kuomintang's main military strength, liberated most parts of the Northeast and North China as well as vast areas north of the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River. This victory had a decisive significance to the overthrow of the Kuomintang's reactionary rule. The Kuomintang's combat units at the time were whittled down to a mere million-odd men. These were deployed over the vast region from Sinkiang in the west to Taiwan in the east, having lost their capability for effective and strategic defense. In the Central-south, the Pai Ch'ung-hsi army group had a total of 40 divisions of 250,000 men. Of these, 27 divisions were assigned to the Yangtze River defenses from I-ch'ang to Huk'ou and the Wuhan area and another 13 divisions deployed in the Ch'angsha-Nanch'ang sector. Besides, the Sung Hsi-lien army group withdrew to western Hupeh and the Yü Han-mou army group was holding Kwangtung. Of these three enemy forces, the Pai Ch'ung-hsi army group constituted the main force defending the Central-south heartland. Wiping out this grouping was the key to speedily liberating the Central-south. Under the direction of US imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang troops commanded by Pai Ch'ung-hsi and others vainly tried to organize stubborn resistance to prevent our army from liberating the Central-south region. But due to low morale, a very long front, exposed and vulnerable segments and restricted mobility of the combat forces, it became impossible to carry out effective defense.

As usual, Right opportunists over-estimated the enemy's strength and under-estimated the revolutionary forces. In the unprecedentedly excellent situation brought about by the victories of the three big campaigns,

Lin Piao's inherent bourgeois nature prevented him from seeing the radical changes that had taken place in the military situation. He exaggerated the Kuomintang's remnant military strength south of the Yangtze River and was afraid of fighting against the Pai Ch'ung-hsi army group.

With foresight Chairman Mao had on numerous occasions analyzed the battle situation and its changes on the basis of the new features of the political and military situation, and criticized the Right opportunist thinking.

On the eve of the river-crossing campaign Chairman Mao made a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the battle situation throughout the country and the balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves. He pointed out: "In terms of numerical strength, morale and equipment the People's Liberation Army is superior to the remnant forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government." If only our army "mounts several more concentrated attacks the entire reactionary ruling structure of the Kuomintang will collapse and perish." "The Chinese People's Liberation Army commands adequate strength and is sufficiently justified and confident of totally wiping out the remnant military forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government in a not very long space of time." In the river-crossing campaign our massive armies from different directions pursued and attacked the fleeing enemies in the wake of victory and with the shattering force of a hurricane. Our Second Field Army swept from the bank of the river to as far as northern Fukien while the Third Field Army advanced eastward and rapidly liberated Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai. Under the crushing blows delivered by our million-strong mighty army converging southward, the only alternative for the Pai Ch'ung-hsi army group entrenched in the Central-south was to prolong a little longer its desperate struggle.

However, Lin Piao obstinately took a Right opportunist stand. He exaggerated the enemy's strength and avoided fighting against an enemy he feared. When the vanguard of the Fourth Field Army consisting of two armies crossed the Yangtze River between Chiuchiang and Wuch'ang in May 1949, the main force of the field army also headed for the northern shore of the Yangtze River. Overwhelmed by our army's power the units commanded by Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Sung Hsi-lien which were then holding the Yangtze River defense line were ready to retreat to the south. To cover their retreat, they feigned moves whereby Pai's main enemy force would approach toward northern Kiangsi from Hunan while Sung Hsi-lien's units would drive north from I-ch'ang and Shashih. Lin Piao misjudged that the enemy would mount an "offensive," so he ordered his troops to adopt the so-called policy of "luring the enemy in deep" and dared not engage the enemy in combat. This accommodated the enemy's strategic intentions and facilitated their withdrawal to the south from their positions in northern Kiangsi, I-ch'ang and Shashih. But our army lost a good opportunity to wipe out the enemy.

Commenting on the subjectivists' approach to basing military planning on wishful thinking, Chairman Mao pointed out: The reason "why they were deceived by the enemy and lured by his superficial or one-sided

moves" was that "battle arrangements and direction of battles did not conform to conditions at that time and place." On the Central-south battlefield Lin Piao failed to see that we were strong and the enemy was weak. He mistook the retreating enemy force for a mighty giant and was afraid to put up a fight. To benefit himself at the expense of others, he passively avoided fighting, and how could he not be deceived by the enemy and lose the chance of putting the initiative in his own hands? This proves that Lin Piao was a typical Right opportunist.

II

To rectify Lin Piao's mistakes and rapidly liberate the Central-south, Chairman Mao further laid out the concept of operations taking account of the fact that the remnant main force of the enemy, the Pai Ch'ung-hsi army group, had retreated to areas north of Changsha and I-ch'un, the Sung Hsi-lien army group to western Hupeh, and the Yü Han-mou army group positioned itself in Kwangtung, and gave Lin Piao a series of directives. Chairman Mao pointed out that after the troops crossed the river they should push forward until they reached Kanchou, Ch'enchou and Yungchou since this would subject Pai Ch'ung-hsi's forces to our army's relentless, sudden and annihilating thrusts. In view of the fact that Pai Ch'ung-hsi's units, with their backs against their old nest in Kwangsi and facing Hunan and Kiangsi, took Hengyang as the center and attempted to delay our army's advance in coordination with Yü Han-mou's units in Kwangtung and the fact that the cunning but fragile enemy would not engage us in decisive battles unless forced to do so, Chairman Mao many times instructed: In fighting with the enemy in any place south of Chaling and Hengchou or in Ch'uanchou and Kweilin or in any other places, we should adopt encircling and flanking tactics not in close distance but in long distance, completely disregard Pai's temporary arrangements and overtake him, occupy his near area and finally force him to fight us. Moreover, Chairman Mao stressed that we must not be taken in by Pai's deceptive tactics and should make plans for a big strategic encirclement, so as to put Pai in a completely passive position. In other words, to destroy Pai's units, it was necessary to adopt the policy of big flanking and encircling movements and then turning back to fight the enemy.

Chairman Mao personally drew up the plans for our army. The 4th Army Corps of the Second Field Army and the 15th Army Corps of the Fourth Field Army, with a total strength of five armies, were to sweep through Kanchou and Shaokuan and capture Canton and destroy the enemy in Kwang-tung. Then, the 4th Army Corps was to penetrate deep into Kwangsi from the south to intercept Pai's forces. Two armies drawn from the 13th Army Corps of the Fourth Field Army were to march from the West to envelop Liuchow via Yuanling and Chihchiang. Six armies drawn from the 12th Army Corps of the Fourth Field Army were to advance from the north to pursue Pai's forces retreating to Kwangsi and wipe them out in that region in coordination with the other armies from the west and south. By following the strategic concept of operations and battle plans laid down by Chairman Mao it would be possible to cut off the retreat of the enemy forces from the Leichou Peninsula or from Kwangsi toward the south,

wipe them out totally, and speedily liberate the whole of the Central-south region.

However, Lin Piao continued to take the Right opportunist stand. He repeatedly misjudged the situation and exaggerated the combat capability of the enemy forces in a futile bid to alter Chairman Mao's strategic deployment and interfere with his concept of operations.

When the main force of our Fourth Field Army entered central Hunan in the latter part of August, Pai feigned a battle formation on the western bank of the Hsiang River and assumed the stance of engaging our army in a fight. Lin Piao then again made a wrong judgment of the enemy's intentions to "fight a decisive battle with us on the western bank of the Hsiang River." Turning to his approach of "luring the enemy in deep" and suggesting that the 4th Army Corps assigned to the task of attacking Canton change direction and advance toward Ch'enchou in Hunan, he altered without authorization the prior arrangements made by Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao discovered Lin Piao's mistake in time and in early September thrice directed: Our army, which was then poised for assaults on Canton and Liuchou and forcing Pai's forces to retreat to Kweilin, must not be deceived by Pai's tricky delaying actions. Chairman Mao also pointed out that Pai's forces would not fight against us in Hunan but would be forced to fight in Kwangsi because Pai would not lightly abandon Kwangsi in favor of entering Yunnan. He ordered the 4th Army Corps on its way to attack Canton not to dispatch any units to Hunan but to head straight toward Canton in conjunction with the 15th Army Corps. Repeated injunctions issued by Chairman Mao checked Lin Piao's mistakes and oriented our army toward the appropriate concept of operations.

In early October the main force of the Fourth Field Army advanced toward Kwangtung and Kwangsi according to the plan set by Chairman Mao. When Lin Piao, who obstinately adhered to a Right military line, discovered that Pai's main force was amassing toward Hengyang-Paoch'ing (Shaoyang) area, he again thought that Pai would settle for a "decisive battle." Thereupon, he on the one hand ordered the north-bound army to stop advancing and consolidating its strength and, on the other, on October 4 he again altered Chairman Mao's plan for the 13th Army Corps to move toward Liuchou by ordering it to move east, enter the Paoch'ing-ch'iyang area, and take part in the Hengyang-Paoch'ing campaign. Lin Piao's wrong move was welcomed by the enemy who took advantage of our army's stalling for consolidation and began to retreat to Tungan and Kweilin on October 6. Fortunately, a certain unit which was poised for an attack on Liuchou did not heed Lin Piao's order to make a halt. Instead, it advanced to a point south of the Hengyang-Paoch'ing highway and thus pinned down the enemy, a move enabling the main force of the Fourth Field Army to surround three fleeing enemy divisions.

On October 10, our army mounted a general attack on the besieged enemy forces. Even at that moment Lin Piao still over-estimated Pai's combat capability. Talking rubbish, he spoke of the "strong fighting power" of the besieged enemy and said "other enemy armies are turning back to reinforce the north." In fact, finding that his forces had been besieged in the Hengyang-Paoch'ing area, Pai Ch'ung-hsi on October 7

ordered his units to "evacuate Hengyang" at once and to disperse toward Kwangsi. "The evacuation process must be carried to completion at any cost, even if it is too late to evacuate the rear units." This shows that Pai was desperate and in a flurry. Lin Piao was then in direct control of ten armies, yet he said he was not "absolutely certain of rapidly wiping out the enemy." He was in favor of transferring the 4th Army Corps, then being readied for attacking Canton, to a "decisive engagement" with Pai's forces. This fully revealed Lin Piao's hideous features of obstinately adhering to a Right military line. In the Hengyang-Paoch'ing campaign more than three enemy divisions numbering over 34,000 men were completely wiped out in the Wufeng mountain area at the foot of Hengshan. The victory of the campaign was the outcome of the brave fighting by the commanders and fighters of the Fourth Field Army. Although this campaign eliminated a portion of the main enemy force, interference by Lin Piao's Right opportunism failed to root out all of Pai's forces and caused the greater part of the enemy troops to flee to Kwangsi. Proceeding from their counter-revolutionary political needs, the members of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique not only did their best to cover up the true features of Lin Piao's Right opportunism but covetously equated this campaign with the three other important campaigns personally directed by Chairman Mao -- Laohsi-Shenyang, Huai-hai and Peiping-Tientsin, and called it the "4th big campaign." How utterly despicable.

When the main force of the Fourth Field Army was conducting the Hengyang-Paoch'ing campaign, the 4th Army Corps of the Second Field Army and the 15th Army Corps of the Fourth Field Army jointly started the Kwangtung campaign in accordance with the deployment plans worked out by Chairman Mao and the Central Committee's Military Affairs Commission. Before our army was about to commence the Hengyang-Paoch'ing campaign, Pai Ch'ung-hsi hurriedly ordered the transfer to the north of his 46th and 97th Armies stationed at the Hunan-Kwangtung border. This split his defense zone from that held by the Yü Han-mou army group, a gap which made it possible for our 4th and 15th Army Corps to push toward northern Kwangtung and raise the curtain of the Kwangtung campaign. On October 6 the Fourth Army Corps liberated the northern Kwangtung stronghold Shaokuan and marched toward Canton along the Canton-Hankow railway.

At the important juncture when the Kwangtung campaign was progressing in triumph, Lin Piao brought up the absurd idea of stopping the march to Kwangtung. In a report to the Military Affairs Commission on October 10, he over-estimated the combat capability of Pai's besieged forces in the Hengyang-Paoch'ing area. He also exaggerated the strength of the enemy reinforcements rushed to the north and argued that our army should stop advancing toward Kwangtung. On the following day when the besieged enemy forces were on the verge of being wiped out, Lin Piao, even though he found out that no enemy reinforcements had been rushed to the north, remained befuddled and proposed to the Military Affairs Commission for "concentrating a superior force to fight against the enemy in Kwangsi" "instead of continuing the attack on Kwangtung." This was in contravention of the concept of operations laid down by Chairman Mao for big flanking and enveloping actions. It likewise interfered with and upset the wise decision made by Chairman Mao and the Military Affairs Commission on the

Kwangtung campaign. If Lin Piao's wrong moves were put into effect, it would have been impossible for our army to liberate Kwangtung in time or to seal off Pai's forces on the southern front. Under these circumstances the main force of Pai's army would have escaped to the sea from the Leichou Peninsula or fled to Vietnam from Kwangsi.

With the overall situation in mind, Chairman Mao on October 12 again told Lin Piao that our army would lose its initiative if Pai's forces deployed north of Kweilin and Liuchou and south of Chiyang and Paoch'ing were not completely surrounded and wiped out. Because Chairman Mao's strategic concept was deeply rooted in the armed forces, the leading comrades of the CCP South China Bureau and of the 4th Army Corps were determined to carry out Chairman Mao's directives and were in favor of attacking Canton before capturing Nanning. On October 14 our Fourth Army Corps together with the 15th Army Corps liberated Canton and removed the coastal stronghold of the Kuomintang bandit group which vainly tried to make a last-ditch stand there.

After Canton was liberated, units of the 4th Army Corps were ordered to proceed to the southwest of Canton in pursuit of the fleeing enemy forces without entering Canton or stopping outside the city. On October 15, however, Lin Piao wrongly ordered the Fourth Army Corps to "stop pursuing and attacking" the enemy troops. To rectify Lin Piao's errors, Chairman Mao on October 17 issued the order to "press ahead with victory." At that time the enemy forces were fleeing to the west by way of the K'aip'ing-Enp'ing area. After surmounting every difficulty, our army followed the adversaries in hot pursuit. Six of our divisions proceeded to the Yangch'un-Yangchiang area in three routes, while the 13th Army Corps pursued the fleeing foes along the upper reaches of the West River, driving toward Sanshui from Shaokuan. At that time the enemy was 200 li away, but the commanders and fighters of our army continued to pursue their fleeing foes despite hunger and fatigue. Finally on October 24 the enemy was cornered in the Yangchiang area. After two days of fierce combat the main force of the enemy forces consisting of the 21st Army Corps and 13th Army Corps and numbering more than 40,000 men was completely wiped out in Kwangtung. This ended the Kwangtung campaign in triumph. Meanwhile, the 13th Army advanced toward the west along the West River and liberated in succession vast areas including Yünfo, Loting, Maoming and Lienchiang. These victories created favorable conditions for finally rooting out the main force of the Pai Ch'ung-hsi army group.

In early December our army vigorously pushed toward Kwangsi from many directions in accordance with the plan set by Chairman Mao. Subsequent operations emphasizing enveloping and annihilating actions resulted in completely wiping out in the Kwangtung-Kwangsi border of more than 170,000 men of the forces commanded by Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Yü Han-mou. Bright five-starred red flags were thus planted on the Central-south front of the fatherland.

III

After the Central-south region was liberated, Chiang Kai-shek named Hsüeh Yüeh "Commander in Chief for the Defense of Hainan." Remnant

forces numbering more than a hundred thousand men were then regrouped, and with the backing of US imperialism, they attempted to build a line of defense shielding Taiwan by making use of the Chiungchou Strait and the offshore islands of Choushan, Chinmen and Wanshan and use it as a springboard for "counter-offensives for the recovery of the country." Whether to liberate Hainan Island as speedily as possible at a time when the enemy had not established a firm footing there or give the enemy a breathing spell by withholding actions against the enemy and putting off the liberation of Hainan -- this was another focal point of the struggle between the two military lines on the Central-south battlefield. Immediately following the conclusion of the Kwangtung-Kwangsi campaign, Chairman Mao in December 1949 and again in January 1950 directed Lin Piao to give priority to the resolution of the Hainan question during the spring and summer seasons. Chairman Mao then analyzed the favorable factors contributing to the Hainan liberation operations, such as the inferior combat capability of the enemy forces on Hainan Island, and the cooperation from the Ch'iungyai Column. He left explicit instructions as to the concept of operations, deployments and methods. It was necessary to take note of the tides and the direction of the wind and to prepare an adequate number of boats, so that sufficient manpower might be carried by one voyage. Units that were to land in front of the enemy must set up and consolidate bridgeheads, must be capable of attacking independently without relying on reinforcements, and must study the experience of fighting across the sea. Lin Piao, however, ignored the impending collapse of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique. Having no faith in the strength of our army and people, he exaggerated the difficulty of seaborne operations and regarded the enemy's naval and air power as insurmountable obstacles. On many occasions he cabled Chairman Mao and the Military Affairs Commission about his absurd suggestions designed to put off indefinitely the Hainan liberation operations on the ground effective seaborne operations should be contingent on the state of preparedness and free from seasonal restrictions and timing factors.

Disregarding Lin Piao's interference our army and people resolutely carried out Chairman Mao's correct instructions. The CCP South China Bureau and the vast numbers of commanders and fighters entrusted with the task of liberating Hainan Island, with the support of the masses of the people, confidently proceeded with preparations for conducting seaborne operations. To conform with this requirement, all participating armed units plunged themselves with vigor into seaborne drills. The commanders and fighters scanned and collected meteorological data on oceans and delved into the history of sea warfare. They also interviewed experienced fishermen and boat builders. Basic seaborne drills covered a broad spectrum of training in combat-readiness in the high seas and on the beaches. Lacking naval craft, the fighters worked together to devise measures to counter enemy gunboats by converting junks into "indigenous gunboats" with the installation of automobile engines. The determination of the commanders and fighters to surmount every difficulty and to actively prepare for war served as a forceful rebuttal to Lin Piao's Right opportunist thinking which exaggerated difficulties and distrusted the revolutionary soldiers and civilians. To prepare adequate ferry boats, our army captured more than 400 junks

from the enemy forces on Weichow Island. After four secret crossings, our vanguard unit became familiar with the defense works of the enemy forces and the navigability of the sea lanes. Our seaborne operations commenced on April 16, supported by a fleet of armed and motorized junks sailing with the strong northeastly wind in the direction of Hainan Island. In coordination with our Ch'iungyai Column operating on Hailan Island and with the assistance of friendly islanders, Hainan Island -- the gateway to South China -- was liberated on April 30. Thanks to Chairman Mao's wise decision and planning, China's second biggest island was speedily liberated, indeed a victory of political and military significance.

Historical facts tell us that Lin Piao consistently took the Right opportunist stand and adhered to a bourgeois military line throughout the battles to liberate the Central-south as he did in the campaign to liberate the Northeast. This line was intended to delay the progress of the Chinese revolution and to oppose the cause of the proletariat and the revolutionary people in seizing and consolidating state power on a nationwide scale. It therefore accommodated and met the needs of the US-Chiang reactionaries. Lin Piao's performance in the battles to liberate the Central-south unmasked him as a man "resolutely carrying out Chairman Mao's march orders" and "meritoriously contributing to the liberation of the people of the whole country and to winning nationwide victories," a claim made by his diehard partners. The torrent of the people's revolution is irresistible. Despite Lin Piao's repeated interference with Chairman Mao's strategic concept and planning during the campaigns to liberate the Central-south, his Right opportunist interference was foiled by Chairman Mao's wise and decisive actions and direct command and because the armymen and civilians in the Central-south resolutely implemented Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. This resulted in a great victory for the war to liberate the Central-south. Reviewing this phase of history is helpful to our further study of Chairman Mao's military thinking and to deepening the criticism of Lin Piao's bourgeois military line.

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A Random Talk on Reading Some History of Literature

by

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Under conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and throughout the historical period of socialism, the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, restoration and counter-restoration, progress and regression will never cease. This struggle also is bound to be reflected in the ideological and cultural field. It is in this field that we must learn how to conduct a protracted, repetitive and arduous struggle against the bourgeoisie. So far as Marxists are concerned, to read some literary works as well as a little history of literature will be helpful in conducting the class and line struggles on the ideological front with better results. In his shining poem "Snow -- to the melody Shen Yüan Ch'un," our great leader Chairman Mao, with the magnificent spirit of a proletarian revolutionary, evaluated some outstanding representative characters of the exploiting class in history. He wrote:

> But alas these heroes! - Ch'in Shih Huang
> and Han Wu Ti
> Were rather lacking in culture;
> Rather lacking in literary talent
> Were the emperors T'ang T'ai Tsung and Sung
> T'ai Tsu;
> And Genghis Khan,
> Beloved Son of Heaven for a day,
> Only knew how to bend his bow at the golden
> eagle.

Even great representatives of the newly emerging landlord class such as Ch'in Shih Huang and the Han emperor Wu could not free themselves from their historical limitations and one-sidedness. "To find men truly great and noble-hearted we must look here in the present"! Revolutionary fighters of the proletariat not only should but also can surpass all predecessors and be skilful with a pen as well as a gun.

"Pen" here refers to ideology, politics, culture and the arts. Reading some novels and a little bit of literary history is also one aspect of fulfilling the "pen" requirements. Some people view novels as "books of leisure," while in fact there is no such thing as "book of leisure" in this world. Is "The Dream of the Red Chamber" a "book of leisure"? With the emergence of this novel, guardians of feudalism, the decadent Confucian scholars in particular, could no longer "sit still" as they rushed around to brand it taboo, repudiate it, distort and tamper with it. Why? Because the novel concerned not the "leisurely moods found in a maiden's bedroom," but class struggle; it was nothing of a love story either, but a novel on political history,

a history of class struggle set in feudal society. The reactionary rulers and the decadent Confucianists scented the smell of class struggle and panicked as they saw in its mirror their ugly features and the historical doom in store for them. But the proletariat and the revolutionary people could learn from this encyclopedia of feudal society the meaning of feudal society, feudal class, feudal oppression and feudal exploitation. The four big families of Chia, Shih, Wang and Hsüeh described in the novel were vivid typical cases of feudal landlords, bureaucrats and aristocrats. The rise and fall of these four big families were an artistic generalization of the rise and fall of the entire feudal class as well as feudal society itself, revealing the extremely complicated class relationships, class contradictions and struggles, including those within the higher echelons of the ruling circles that rocked feudal society in its "twilight days." Moreover, one may understand the decadent economic base and superstructure of feudal society -- from the state machine to ideology. One may understand how the declining feudal class and its system were heading toward total collapse amidst the flare of ever intensifying contradictions and crises. The author Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in profoundly depicted this disintegrating process on the basis of painstaking research, thus helping us understand the historical laws of inevitable extinction of all reactionary and decadent classes and social systems. The many typical images portrayed by the author -- such as Chia Cheng, Wang Hsi-feng, Hsüeh Pao-ch'ai, Chia Yü-ts'un and others -- also help us recognize the class nature of reactionary classes. The images of a pair of rebels against the landlord class -- Chia Pao-yü and Lin Tai-yü -- also reflect the laws governing class differentiation in feudal society during its descending period.

Take another example. "Water Margin" is a full-length novel about peasant uprisings. Despite the fact that, due to the limitation of the author's class stand, the novel is inclined to oppose corrupt officials but not the emperor and even goes to the extent of extolling Sung Chiang's capitulationist line, it still helps us comprehend the strong points and weaknesses of peasant rebellions in feudal times as well as the historical lessons drawn from their defeat. The feudal scholar Yü Wan-ch'un knew very well that this novel had nothing "leisurely" in it, and therefore he not only condemned it as "pernicious," but cudgeled his brains and wrote his "Tang K'ou Chih" (Tales of Bandit Extermination) to offset the impact of "Water Margin" among the masses of people. Did the decadent Confucians not say aloud that "women should not read 'The Dream of the Red Chamber,' and men should not read 'Water Margin'"? They were afraid that the masses of people might use these novels as a weapon in their struggle against the reactionary ruling class and the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius.

Literary works are products of reflection of social life in writers' minds. Lu Hsün termed literature as the "induction nerve" of classes, "the hands and feet for offense and defense." This is precisely because it is most sensitive in reflecting social life and class struggle, and therefore it is a powerful weapon for class struggle. The changes in class relationships in society, the emergence, rise and

fall of a certain class,the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, restoration and counter-restoration, progress and regression in social history, the rise and decline as well as alternation of various social and political tides of thought, and all kinds of representatives of all classes that appeared during the fierce class struggle -- all these are more or less reflected in literary works. To be sure, such reflections in literary works of the past suffer from considerable limitations and are often one-sided and devious and at times even distorted. Even in the case of those fine literary works, because their authors mostly came from exploiting classes and always depicted their contemporary life from the world outlook of their exploiting class, they are inevitably stamped with a deep class coat of arm. Even so, they still serve as records of a given period as they are indispensable materials for an understanding of class relationships and class struggle of past ages and for summing up the historical experience of class struggle. Some works, such as "Feng Shen Yen I" (封神演义), "Pilgrims to the West" (西游記) and "Liao Chai Chih I" (聊斋志异) appear to be stories about fairies and ghosts, whereas in fact they are reflections of political life and class struggle in the actual society. "Feng Shen Yen I" concerns a great struggle by the slave-owners of the Chou Dynasty. In "Liao Chai Chih I," stories such as "Tsu Chih" have a strikingly vivid political content. Provided we use the Marxist class viewpoint and method of class analysis and read these novels as history of class struggle, we shall be able to draw from them the historical experience of class struggle to serve actual class and line struggles and to work for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and continue the revolution under this dictatorship.

Needless to say, in order to really understand a work, we must not only have the Marxist viewpoint, but must also read some history, including some history of literature. To really appreciate a work, we have to trace its origin, put it in the context of the class relationships at that given period, and study it from the historical evolution of class struggle. Why was it that "The Dream of the Red Chamber" emerged during the middle period of the Ch'ien Lung era in the Ch'ing Dynasty? We can find the answer only if we relate it to the political and economic changes that took place in the last days of feudal society, the class and political struggles that shook the society of that time as well as the struggle waged in the ideological realm between the worshippers of Confucius and their opponents.

The history of the development of literature has never been isolated from class struggle in society. A history of literature is also a history of class struggle. In a society with opposing classes, a unified literary movement is impossible. A literary movement, a literary creation and a literary trend of thought are invariably divided into two. Just as Lenin pointed out, "Every national culture invariably consists of two kinds." In every society, there is always the contradiction between the oppressing class and the oppressed class, the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, progress and regression, restoration and counter-restoration. Reflected in the realm of

literature, there is both a progressive literature reflecting the thoughts and aspirations of the revolutionary class or progressive social forces and a reactionary literature reflecting the interests of the counter-revolutionary class or the reactionary and decadent social forces. Reading some literary history may help us understand from one aspect the laws governing the evolution of class struggle--how the reactionary ruling class in history used literature to consolidate its reactionary rule and how the revolutionary class used literature to fight against the exploiters and oppressors. The Confucian-Legalist struggle throughout the more than 2,000 years of feudal society in our country similarly was pervaded by more than 2,000 years of literary history. Essays by scholars of the hundred schools of thought in the pre-Ch'in period were products of the class struggle, especially the struggle between the Confucianists and the Legalists, during that period of major social changes. The same goes with poetry. Just by reading the long poem "Li Sao" written by the first great poet of ancient China, Ch'ü Yüan, we can appreciate the violent struggle between the newly emerging landlord class and the declining slave-owner class during the latter period of the Warring States more than 2,000 years ago. In this poem, Ch'ü Yüan, as a political representative of the newly emerging landlord class, angrily exposed and criticized those reactionary and decadent slave-owner aristocrats that resorted to treason in exchange for their own glory, delineating their ugly features and dissecting their despicable minds while at the same time projecting the image of a hero of the newly emerging landlord class who fought unflaggingly and sacrificed his life for his political ideals. Although this magnificent poem was full of romantic and strange fantasy, exploring a world that could only exist in a myth, it actually dealt with the struggle between the two political lines in the state of Ch'u at that time.

The Confucian-Legalist struggle was also clearly manifested in the literary history in the post-Ch'in and Han periods. The ancient literary movement of the T'ang Dynasty was one that split into two. Its two chief protagonists were Han Yü and Liu Tsung-yüan, the former a Confucian, the other a Legalist. Although both opposed the euphuistically antithetic style of writing as well as the soft and decadent, pompous and unsubstantial literary style prevalent in the Six Dynasties, the political and ideological lines they advocated and pushed were opposed to each other. Han Yü favored the classical style for the purpose of returning to the past, the "past" of King Wen and King Wu, Duke Chou and Confucius. He declared explicitly: "My interests in the classical style stems not only from its expressions but from the Way it embodies." The "Way" he was referring to was the way of Confucius and Mencius. On the contrary, Liu Tsung-yuan advocated the classical style for the sole purpose of carrying out his Legalist line. His noted thesis "On Feudalism" was a typical example of how he used his style of free prose to propagate the Legalist political views. In the Sung period, the confrontation between Wang An-shih and such people like Ssu-ma Kuang is well known to all. Therefore the eight big schools of T'ang and Sung so referred to in the old literary history books, were actually made up of two schools, the

Confucian and the Legalist. Not only prose but also T'ang poetry, Sung poetry, the music of Yüan and the novels of Ming and Ch'ing were all influenced by the Confucian-Legalist struggle. Of course, the history of development of literature has its own special characteristics in contradiction, distinct from that of the political Confucian-Legalist struggles, but the two were closely linked together from first to last. The reason is that "all culture, all literature and art belong to definite classes and are geared to definite political lines." So, reading some history of literature may help us understand and sum up the historical experience of the Confucian-Legalist struggle.

While reading some representative ancient and modern literary works, it is also necessary to read some works on the history of literature. Lu Hsün's "An Outline of the History of Han Literature" and "A Brief History of Chinese Novels" are still the best works on the history of literature. In "An Outline of the History of Han Literature," Lu Hsün sums up the history of literature in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods up to the turn of Ch'in and Han dynasties, observing the laws concerning the evolution of literature from the viewpoint of the Confucian-Legalist confrontation. It is a book in which every page shines with the brilliance of opposing Confucius. "A Brief History of Chinese Novels" makes a detailed introduction to and an incisive analysis of the origin and evolution of novels as well as authors and their works in various historical periods of our country. In scientifically summing up the history of the development of Chinese literature, Lu Hsün sets us a brilliant example.

Historical experience tells us: We must not only be good at conducting struggles with the bourgeoisie in the economic and military fields, we must also be good at fighting against them in the political, ideological and cultural fields, using Marxism to dominate the entire realm of the superstructure, including philosophy, history, education, literature, art and the law. Therefore, comrades engaged in economic and military work should be concerned with the revolution in the superstructure and read some novels and some history of literature. Similarly, comrades operating in the superstructure should also learn something about military affairs and learn to do some practical work. If not, we will not be able to meet the demand for carrying on the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Our great leader Chairman Mao has always attached great importance to the questions of literature and art as an important aspect of the great political struggle in which the proletariat will defeat the bourgeoisie and Marxism revisionism. Early in 1942, in the course of a great rectification campaign, Chairman Mao personally grasped the questions of literature and art and published his epoch-making Marxist-Leninist document, "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art." In it, he creatively enriched and developed the Marxist world outlook and literary and art theory, and provided our Party with a proletarian revolutionary line on literature and art. Since the founding of the People's Republic, Chairman Mao has personally initiated and led several major struggles on the political and ideological front, which, from the criticism of the films "The Story of Wu Hsün" and "The Inside History

of the Ch'ing Court" to the great revolution in Peking opera and the practice of the revolutionary model plays all the way up to the great proletarian cultural revolution, were all first started in the field of literature and art. As to classic literature, Chairman Mao in his "Letter on Problems Concerning the Study of 'The Dream of the Red Chamber'" twenty years ago issued the great call to criticize the idealism of the Hu Shih school. Fundamentally speaking, literary and art issues are political issues. Chairman Mao has repeatedly called on us to take an interest in the superstructure, to be capable of using a pen and a gun, to encourage reading some history and some novels. This call has been put forward on the basis of summing up the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in accordance with the historical imperative of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, continuing the revolution under this dictatorship and preventing the restoration of capitalism, and in line with the great strategic objective of exercising all-round proletarian dictatorship in all spheres of the superstructure. That is why we urge everyone to read some novels and some history of literature.

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